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Renewed growth in Senegal calls for more worker training,
fewer government regulations, less trade protection, and more
cooperation between labor and  industry - for example, by
linking wage supplements to performance indicators.
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encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in  development issues These papers carry the names of
the  authors,  refect only their  views, and  should  he  used  and  cited  accordingly The findings.  tnterpresauons,  and  conclusions  are  the
















































































































dPlcy, Planning,  and Rese.rch
Mcroeconomic  Adjustment
and  Growth
Senegal is in the grip of a long-tern economic  * Protection generates inefficiency. This in-
crisis.  Senegalese industry suffers from a highly  efficiency is not an economic rent reflected in
adversarial system of industrial and labor  higher wages.  Recent policies aimed at reducing
relations, excessive govemment regulations in  protection should improve productivity.
some areas and inadequate government support
in others, and many misperceptions about the  *  Popular hypothesis is that the more firms in
ethnically diverse labor force and cnterprise  developing countries are exposed to world
ownership. Terrell and Svejnar conclude that:  markets, the more productive they become.
Terrell and Svejnar round that  the extent of an
* Senegal needs to adopt a social compact  enterprise's export orientation had no bearing on
that would replace the current adversarial system  its productive efficiency.
with more cooperation among labor, industry,
and the government. Linking a part of worker  * The unwillinigness  of firms to invest in
compensation.(for example, the wage supple-  physical and human capital - combined with
ment) to specific individual or group perform-  labor market and other govemment regulations
ance indicators would increase worker motiva-  - seems to have contributed to Senegal's
tion.  decline in total factor productivity.
C  Currc.it regulations contribute to the un-  * The average contribution of inon-Africans
deruse of labor.  Relaxing regulations about  has been high, but their gradual exodus appears
(paid) hours of work, layoffs, and the use of  to have benefited Senegal's economy.
temporary (daily) workers would, along with
transfer payments, improve the welfare of all  *  Special consideration should be given to
parties.  retraining displaced workers within existing
firms rather than outside of them, as the return
* Some form of collective action or govem-  (in terms of eamings) is higher on firm-specific
ment intervention may be needed to provide the  experience than on general experience.
training that firms do not provide for fear of later
being raided by other firms.  * The burdens of rising unemployment and
limited hiring of young workers are borne
* No particular type of ownership has been  mostly by older industrial workers who must
linked with higher productivity, so policies  support ever larger extended families and would
geared toward changing enterprise ownership or  thus benefit from economic growth.  Output
providing preferentiai treatment toward certain  growth would also probably increase workers'
types of ownership should be based on a careful  eamings.
examination of specific cases, not general rules
(such as privatization, Senegalization, or prefer-
ential treatment of foreign capital).
This paper is a product of the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division,
Country Economics Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,
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059, extension 61760 (124 pages with tables).
Thc PPR Working Paper Scrics disseminates the findings of work under way in thc Bank's Policy, Planning, and Rescarch
Complex. An objectivc of thc scrics is to get these  findings out quickly,  even if prcsentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of thc Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterContents
Acknowledgme
Fowword Guy 1ffermnn
1  Introduction  1
2  The Economic Performance of Senegal, 1960-1987  5
2.1  Structure and Growth of the GDP, 5
2.2  Structure and Growth of the Industial  Sector, 8
3  Labor Market Institutions and the Industrial
Relations System  13
3.1  Specific Institutional Aspects, 15
3.1.1 Hiring, 15
3.12  Employment  Contacts,  16
3.1.3  Layoffs, 17  P
3.2  Wages, Bonuses, and Supplements, 17
4  Basic Demograpiic,  Employment,  and Wage Statistics  21
4.1  The Demographic Situation, 21
4.2  Labor Force, Employment,  and Unemployment, 22
4.3  Industrial Employment  in the Modern Sector, 24
4.3.1 Employment of Permanent Workers, 25
4.3.2 Employment of Temporary Workers, 28
4.3.3 National Composition of  Employment, 31
4.4  Earnings, 34
4.4.1 Components of Total Compensation, 34
4.4.2 Evolution of Wages by Skill Groups, 38
4.4.3 Evolution of Total Compensation by
National and Skil Groups, 405  Labor Market Regulations, Industral  Rdations,
and Enterprise Performance  43
5.1  The Position of C;overnment  Officials,  43
5.2  Managers' Views, 45
5.2.1  Restrictive Labor Regulations, 45
5.2.2  Recruitment and Tainin& 46
5.3  Workers' Views  of Unions, 49
5.4  Trade Union Perspective, 50
5.5  The Nonuoperative  Outcome, 51
6  The Productuinty  Effects of Labor Force Strucure,
Enterprise Ownership, and Foreign Trade Variables  53
6.1  Overall Production Function Estimates, 56
6.2  Industry-Specific  Production
Function Estimates, 70
7  Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of Wages  101
8  Industrial Wages and the Extended Family  107
8.1  Size of Extended Families, 108
8.1.1 Nuclear Families, 108
8.1.2 Non-nuWdear  Families, 110
8.2  Relationship Between Earnings and the
Extended Family, 112
8.3  Secondary Income, 114
9  Summary and Policy Implications  117
9.1  Summary, 117
9.2  Policy  ImpLications,  119
References  123
Index  125Acknowledgments
The research for this monograph was in large part funded by
grant no. 674-03 of the World Bank Research Committee.  We
are especially indebted  to Guy Pfeffermann for conceiving the
idea and assisting us in launching and implementing  the project.
Without his guidanice  and supervision the study would not have
been  realized.  We  are  also grateful to  a  number of  other
individ-ials  and organizations  that provided invaluable  help during
the research project:  Mark Leiserson  contributed enormously  to
the project'r formation, and the World  Bank Senegal  Division,  the
Industrial S.rategy and  Policy Division, and the  World Bank
Resident Mission in Dakar assisted in our fieldworlk We are
particularly  grateful  to  Kemal Dervis,  Christian  Duvigneau,
Nicolas  Gorestani  Frans Kaps,  Christopher Redfern,  and Eugene
Scanteie.
We extend special thanks to Mine. Thiongane, the Director of
Statistics at the Ministry of Finance in Senegal,  for providing us
with the data; to Prospere Youm, the Director of Forecasting at
the Ministry of Finance, for providing  data on the effective rate
of protection; and to Alhousseney Sy, the Chief of the Census
Bureau, for collaborating  with us on the sample survey.  The trade
union representatives and numerous enterprise managers who
provided  us  with  their- perspectives  have  made  valuable
contnbutions to qpruinderstanding of Senegal's industrial sector
and its labor market institutions.
Finally, we thank Bela Balassa, Guy Standing, Gerald Starr,
Erik Thorbecke, and the participants at the World Bank seminar
for their many helpful comments, Sathi Pandian and Seng-Lee
Wong for their excellent computational assistance, and Lauree
Graham for invaluable help in the preparation of the manuscript.
All remaining errors are our own.
Kadwrine Temrel
Jan SveinarForeword
Nearly 25 years ago, I interviewed  industrial workers and their
employers  in SenegaL Industrial Labor in the Reoublic of Senegal
(Praeger,  New York,  1968) tells the  story.  Labor  market
imperfections, mostly inherited from French colonial legislation
and institutions but also rooted in the extended family system,
were so egregious as to stifle development. The replacement of
expatriates by African workers was proceeding at a snail's pace,
government and union wage policies were curbing employment
growth,  vocational schools were turning out graduates unsuitable
for industrial employment. Wage and other regulations intended
to advance the workers' welfare failed to achieve their objectives.
The  extended  family  system obliged workers  to  support  a
multitude of  unemployed hangers-on, all the  more numerous
owing to polygamism,  and this undercut incentives to strive for
better  pay  and  to  save  more.  Labor  market  distortions
encouraged  enterprises  to  use  capital-intensive methods  of
production rather than to expand employment. And a parallel
'informal sector" had sprung up of firms small enough to evade
labor legislation.  I
Like the Three Musketeers, TerreUl  and Svejnar  have revisited
the Senegalese labor ma*et  20 years or so later.  Undoubtedly,
some things have chaige;d. Fewer expatriates are now  working in
SenegaL But the striking picture which emerges is that mostly,
things have remained unchanged.  Labor regulations are still
pervasive and largely self-defeating. Labor productivity  remains
low.  The supply of skilled workers remains limited.  And the
burden of the extended family on wage-earners has become even
greater.  The  authors  document this unhappy situation very
carefully  with the help of interviews  and detailed surveys,  and ask
themselves to what extent Senegal's uncommonly poor growth
performance can be traced to labor market imperfections. They
draw policy  implications  and make recommendations  that address
some of the root causes of stagnation. These should be of greatinterest to the Government,  which  has been striving  to improve
the structure of the economy  so as to accelerate  growth in a
sustainable  manner. The book  will also be of interest to other
developing  countries  whose  labor  market institutions  have  much
in common  with Senegpl's.
Guy Pffe,maim
Economic  Adviser  to the International  Finance  Corporation
World  Bank  Group1
]Introduction
Senegal is in the grip of a long-term economic crisis.  Since
1960, it has experienced the smallest growth in gross domestic
product (GDP)-2.3 percent--of any African country not affected
by war or civil strife.  Moreover, data suggest that the GDP per
capita has been at best stagnant ard probably falling over the last
twenty years as the productivity and real income of most of the
population have not been raised since independence.  Since the
late  1970s  the Senegalese government has recognized the need
to embark on a sustained and long-term adjustment program and
has searched for appropriate policies to pursue this goal. In this
context, an important objective  of this study is to provide an up-
to-date analysis  of several issues that are pertinent to the ongoing
debate  in  the  choice  of  appropriate  adjustment policies in
Seneral.  Since many pro'olems  examined in this study have been
encountered in other countries, we hope that our analysis  also has
broader policy ramificatiois.
One of the structirtltauses  of the current economic crisis is
believed to  be the  inability of the modern sector to raise its
overall share  of employment as  well as  its  productivity and
average real earnings in the  past two decades.  The sluggish
performance of the modern (formal) industrial sector has been
the subject of major debate, given  that the sector had a relatively
matire  base  at  independence,  has  received  considerable
investment since then, and has enjoyed significant  protection as
well as  preferential  trade  agreements in  both  the  European
(EEC) and West African (CEAO) Economic Community.
Most economists agree that employment in the informal urban
sector has grown over the past two decades but that the formal
sector  has not  generated  much employment and  has  instead
switched to more capital-intensive methods of production.  It is
also  suggested  that  public  enterprises  have  been  the  only
significant  providers of jobs in the modern sector. A recent study
by Mingat (1982)  claims, however,  that employment  generation in2
the informal sector has slowed. What has increased, according to
this study, is the level of open unemployment  in the urban labor
.narket. These opposing views illustrate the prevailing lack of
basic knowledge  about the structural features and functioning of
Senegal's industrial sector and labor market.  They have also
provided us with dn important motivation for undertaking the
present study.
Our goal IS  to examine Senegal's industrial labor market and
relate  its  principal features,  together  with  the  structure  of
enterprise  ownership and government policies, to the country's
economic performance.  Our primary aim is to assess how the
employment  and  wage  setting system affects allocative and
productive efficiency  of industrial enterprises. Because efficiency
is widely  believed to be tied to the structure of ownership and to
the government's ;ndustrial and trade policies,  our secondary aim
is to  estimate the  total factor productivity effects of different
forms of enterprise ownership,  the degree of effective  protection
of firms, and enterprise export orientation.
The emphasis of our study is on the modern industrial sector,
although  linics with  other  sectors  in  the  economy are  also
explored. The modem industrial sectco'  includes  large as well as
relatively small firms (e.g. ones with LJ employees) and for the
purposes of this  study it is defined as that part  of industrial
activity  which is systematically  recorded by official  statistics. Our
focus on the mod;prnseZtor is motivated by the fact that (1) its
economic performance is believed to have been largely impeded
by government regulations and could therefore be expected to
improve significantly  as a result of more appropriate policies; (2)
it provides thc: maiority of Senegal's exports;  and (3) in the long
term  it should play a  leading part in spearheading economic
growth, in generating employment,  and in absorbing and diffusing
new  technologies.  Moreover,  relatively reliable  data  and
qualitative information on this sector were available or could be
gathered  within a  relatively short  period of  time.  Finally,
knowledge of the characteristics and performance of the formal
labor market provides an important yardstick against which one
can compare and evaluate the performance of the informal labor
market.
The main part of our analysis  relates to the period from 1980
to 1986. The selection of this time period was guided by both the
need for  policy relevance and data  availability.  However, to3
provide  a  fuller  understanding of  the  main  issi  -as and  the
underlying dynamics,  the findings  from this period are compared
with those of Pfeffermann (1968) for the 196(s and, whenever
possible, with those of Svejnar (1984) for the mid 1970s.
As  mentioned  above,  our  main  aim  is  to  provide  an
understanding of the functioning of the industrial la' 'r  market
and  evaluate the  effects of the employment and wage s3tting
practices on enterprise efficiency. In undertaking this task, we
pay particular attention to government wage and employment
regulations; the  role  of  trade  unions  and  the  organizational
characteristics of firms; the national and skill composition of the
labor force and the corresponding labor productivity and wage
differentials;  the  existence  of  training  schemes  and  skill
bottlenecks; the effect of education, experience, and training on
worker earnings; and the relationship  between a worker's income
and the migration of family members from the countryside.
Our  approach  is  to  combine  institutional  analysis with
econometric estimation. In Chapter 2 we provide a brief survey
of Senegal's economic performance, focusing  on the evolution of
the industrial sector. In Chapter 3 we describe the main features
of the Senegalese industrial relations system, and in Chapter 4 we
discuss basic statistical evidence  relating to the characteristics of
the labor force, employment, and worker earnings.  Chapter 5
contains an institutional analysis  of the impact of labor regulations
and the industrial reliti6ns system on economic performance in
industry;  chapters 6 and 7 present the corresponding  econometric
analysis.  Chapter 6 also contains estimates of the productivity
effects of the national and skill composition of the labor force,
different  forms  of  enterprise  ownership, and  foreign  trade
variables. This analysis  is based on data from a relatively sizable
enterprise sample which we collected during the course of the
research project.  Chapter 7 presents econometric estimates of
the determinants of worker earnings in a smaller (sub) sample of
modern sector industrial enterprises.  Chapter 8 is devoted to
exploring the relationship between industrial wages and the size
of the extended family. Finally,  Chapter 9 presents the summary
and policy conclusions.2
The Economic  Performance
of Senegal, 1960 - 1987
At independence,  Senegalese  nationals  inherited a relatively
weliequipped  physical  and social  infrastructure  and a GDP per
capita that was larger than that of either the Ivory Coast or
Cameroon.  Over the quarter  of a century  that followed,  however,
the economy  failed  to raise either  labor productivity  or real per
capita incor-e. Official  data actually  suggest  that real GDP per
capita  decrc .ed by  4 percent  between  1967  and 1987,1  while  real
output  per  employec and  real  earnings per  employee in
manufacturing  dropped  31 percent and 33 percent,  respectively,
during  the 1974  - 1985  period. As a result,  by 1983  Senegal's  per
capita income  of $440  (using  the 1987  exchange  rate) was barely
half that of Cameroon  and the Ivory Coast,  placing  it near the
bottom of the ranks of lower  middle-income  oil importers. The
following  two sections  describe  how  the structure  and growth  of
gross  domestic  product  changed  between  1960  and 1986.
2.1 Stricture and Growth  of the GDP
Despite certain structural changes, the  Senegal economy
strongly  refects the production  patterns established  during  the
colonlial  period. As  can be seen in Table  2.1,  Senegal  already  had
a relativel large secondar and tertiary  sector at independence
1. Tbb  result i band on calculatons  from  the foUowing  data: current  GDP  in
1967  205S  bilion  CFA  (Afican  Financial  r  inmunity)  Francs,  current  GDP  in
1987  - 1419  bilion CFA Francs,  GDP deK  i  £ in 1967  - 42,  GDP deflator  in
1987  - 177.6,  population  In 1967  - 4,117,000,  and  popuation  in 1987  - 6,969,000.
Ihe officil data are taken  from  World  Bank  (1988  - 89),  volume  2, pp. 486-487.
2. Seel6
in 1960.3 In the past twenty-seven  years, the share of production
has increased by about 50  percent in the secondary sector and
fallen slightly  in the primary and tertiary sectors.
Essentially, the  traditional part of agriculture still produces
miJlet and  cattle  for  domestic consumption, and  the  export-
oriented  part  produces  groundnuts.  Domestic  agricultural
production  does  not  cover  consumption--nearly one-half  of
Senegal's basic food st. ffs are imported.'  As we show later, the
modern sector produces primarily light industrial goods and is
highly concentrated regionally  and in terms of ownership.
TABLE 2.1
Sencpl  Structure  of Production
Share of GDP (%)
(in current prices)
Seocor  1960'  1970'  1980  1986b  1987b
Primnty  243  24.1  19.1  21.8  21.6
Seconday  18.6  21.5  24.9  24.8  25.7
T  ary  57.1  i  56.0  53.4  52.7
-urce:  iWorld Bank,  Senegal:  Countuy  Economic  Memorandum 1984,  pA.
Oiltematorad Monetary  Fund (IMF) Senegal  - Statistical  Anna.  1988,  p. iv.
(Figures for 1987  are preliminary).
The limited change in the structure of production reflects the
general lack of dynamism in the economy. As can be seen in
Table 2.2, real GDP growth declined from an  average of 2.5
percent a year throughout the 1960s  to an average of 1.9  percent
3.  The primary sector contains agriculture,  livestock,  fishing  and forestry. The
secondary  sector  contains  industry  and mining,  construction  and public works,  and
enerr.  The  tertiary sector is composed of transportation, commerce, and
govenument  and other private serices.
4.  For a recent account of issues  related to Senegal's  agriculture,  see Gersovitz
and Waterbury  (1987).7
in the 1970s,  but it accelerated to over 3 percent in the 1980s.
With population growth estimated  at 2.8  percent throughout these
two and a half decades, the trend in the per capita GDP has been
at best stagnant and probably  declining.
TABLE  22
Senegal Estimated  Real  Annual Grwth  in GDP,
Totl  ad  by Sector
Sector  1960 9 708  197080 8 9  1987b
Primary  3.0  -0.4  2.7  2.8
Secondary  4.2  2.7  4.2  73
Tertiary  1.7  13  2VI  2.7
Total  25  1.9  3.1  4.0
Note:  Based on series  in 1979  constant  prices
Source:  "World Bank, SeneuaL  Country  Econonic Memorandum 1984,  p. 4;
World Bank, SenefaL  An EconoMy  Under Adjustment.  1987.
bIMF, Senezal - Statistical  Anne'  1988,  estimates.  P
Most of the decline in the real growth of GDP came in the
second half of the 1970s.  .As  a result of severe droughts in 1977-
1978 and  decliningproduction  incentives, net  output  in  the
primary sector declined by an average of 3.9 percent per year
from 1975  to 1980. Growth of output in the secondary  sector also
slowed down to 2.2 percent per annum during the latter half of
the  1970s, down from an  average growth of 3.2 percent  per
annum in the  first half of the 1970s  and 4.2 percent per  year
during the 1960s. Only the service  sector (which includes public
administration) grew at a faster rate in 1975-1980  than in 1970-
1975.
The growth of the public (government) sector in 1975-80  has
been steady, with the share of government consumption in final
demand rising from 14.9  percent in 1970  to 19.8  percent in 1983.
A particularly rapid increase occurred between 1975 and  1980,
when the share jumped from 15.2  to 22.4 percent. The growth of
public expenditures during this period is explained  partially  by the8
large costly  programs  that the government  implemented  in these
years in order to diversify  the economy  and develop  Senegl's
human resources. Some economists  maintain  that during this
period an excessive  share  of public  investment  was used  for social
purposes,  to maintain  consumption  patterns  of the urban elite,  or
to extend  public  control  of the economy  rather than  to create  new
productive  capacity.
Although  economic  mismanagement,  together  with  poor  rainfag
and adverse  external  factors,  had already  eroded the countys
strength,  an acute  drought  in 1977-1978,  the 1979  increase  in oil
prices,  and two  additional  poor  groundnut  crops in 1979  and 1980
almost  crippled  Senegal's  economy.  In 1980,  real GDP fell  by 1.5
percent  with a further  2.4  percent  decline  occurring  in 1981.  The
deficit  on the external  virrent account  reached  US$584  milion,
or 23.6  percent of GDP in 1981.
It is argued  that the roots  of the liquidity  crisis  in 1980-1981  lay
in the failure of the government  to control  the growth  of total
expenditures.  In  the late  1970s the  government begn  to
recognize  the shorncomings  of its development  plans  and started
efforts  to adjust  to the crisis.
In 1982  and 1983  there was a strong  recovery  in GDP, with
estimated growth rates  of  15.1 percent and  2.7 percent,
respectively;  however,  following  the severe  drought  of 1983-1984,
the whole  economy  suffersd  a recession  of the same  -mplitude  as
that of 1980-1981.B6en  so,  because  of the two  good  years  before
the drought  and a 4.1 percent  annual  growth  in real GDP during
the 1985-1987  period,  there has been overall  resurgence  in the
economic  activity  in recent  years.  (See  Table 2.2.)
2.2 Structure  and Growth  of the Industrial  Sector
As seen above, the principal  engine  of growth in Senegal's
economy from 1960 to  1986  was the secondary  sector, with
industry accounting  for over 60 percent of its value added.
However,  as Table  23 demonstrates,  since  1976  even  the growth
in the industrial  sector has been disappointing.  Since  this  sector
is a crucial  element of Senegal's  economy,  we next discuss  its
composition  and growth  patterns.
The industrial  sector is essentially  made up of three resource-
based export-oriented  industries-groundnut  processing,  phos-
phate mining, and  fish processing-and  a  range of  import-9
substituting  light  industries.  It is a highly  concentrated  sector.  140
of the 600 modern industrial  enterprises account  for over 94
percent of total sales. Virtually  all subbranches  of industry  are
dominated by 1 or  2 companies,  usually either government
controiled  or foreign  owned.  About  one-haf of all  enterprises  are
under  French-majority  ownership.  The government holds
majority interests in  17 of  the  most important industrial
companies.  Hence  foreign  and  Senegalese  government  ownership
are notable  and interrelated  features  of the industrial  sector  with
the former being in many respects more significant  than the
latter.
In general, the level of production  in the industrial sector
between 1977  and 1981  was at or below  the 1976  leveL  Growth
resumed  in the 1982-1985  period but a decline  occurred  in 1986.
(See Table 23.)  The textiles,  clothing.  and leather sectors,  the
wood products  sectors,  and the paper producing  sectors have
reported the strongest  performance  over  this  period,  although,  as
we will show  in Chapter 4, this performance  has not been fully
reflected  in employment  growth.  Moreover,  some  sectors,  notably
chemicals,  construction  materials,  and machinet and equipment,
have suffered  a serious  decline  in production  smce 1977.
Manufacturing  has been heavily  oriented  toward  the domestic
market,  with exports  representing  less than 20 percent of total
industrial  sector  sales. Puwcessed  primary  products  go to Europe
(especially  Franc9),:and light manufactured  goods are traded
almost  exclusively  to the CEAO  trade zone neighbors. Despite
preferential tariff arrangements  in both the EEC and CEAO
markets,  export  growth  and diversification  has been  slow.  In 1986,
processed  primary  products  (groundnuts,  phosphates,  petroleum
products,  and fish) still  constituted  two-thirds  of Senegal's  total
exports of goods and 90 percent of the country's exports to
developed country markets.  Excluding  groundnuts, exports
declined  by almost  20 percent in real terms between 1977  and
1984,  although  some  recovery  has oocurred  since  1980.  Only  fish
exports  demonstrated  consistent  real  growth  over the period,  but
further  growth  is expected  to be limited  due to the exhaustion  of
this valuable  resource.
The trade regime  in Senegal  is  considered  to have  been  a prime
example  of overlapping  policies  with  contradictory  effects. Until
very  recently,  nominal  tariffs  were  high  (ranging  from  25  percent10
TABLE  2.3
SeneaL  libm  atl  bduial  Produc
(1976-100)
1978a  1981k  1983i  198 b  1986b
Mining  95.9  107.4  843  1126  107.7
Food Production  91.6  88.5  109.7  1032  99.6
Textiles,  Clothing
and Leather  101.0  110A  139.9  133.9  123.0
Wood Products  111.0  127.1  133.0  119.0  1002
Paper  113.6  120.6  1375  120.1  130.5
chemicals  1042  85.5  73.1  77.9  51.9
Construction
mnaterials  103A  94.7  128.6  94.1  83.8
Machineiy  and
Equipment  110.6  61.8  93.6  78.1  41.0
Electricity  and
Water  1215.~-r'  134.6  148.7  155.0  166A
General Index  with-
out oil processing  106.8  108.2  111A  119.6  1125
General ladcx  982  972  107.1  107.6  99.6
Source:  aDirection de la Statistique,  Indice de la Production  Industielle, in
World  Bank, SenegaL  An Economy  Under Adu stment 1987,  p. 96.
bnMP,  Senega - Statistical  Anna;  1988.
to  90  percent)  and  escalated  sharply  for  finished  goods.
Quantitative  import  restrictions  existed  for  about  160
commodities, with significant effects on domestic market prices.
The  average level of protection in  the  domestic market was
uneven and high,  probably equal to at least 50 percent of the cost,
insurance, and freight (CIF) value of competing world products
(World Bank, 1984,  p. 69).  The gradual lowering of tariffs and
diminution of quantitative restrictions  since the mid 1980s  has led11
to  a  much greater  opening of  Senegal's economy.  As  our
estimates in Chapter 6 indicate, one can expect this new industrial
policy to  result in  a  significant increase in  efficiency of the
surviving  firms.
In  summary,  Senegal's  economy  has  performed  poorly
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s,  with growth resuming at
a  somewhat faster pace from the mid  1980s on.  As  for the
industrial sector, the rate of growth of output was above average
until the mid 1970s  and, after a hiatus of several years, again in
the  1980s.  However,  several  industrial  sectors,  including
chemicals,  construction materials, and machinery and equipment
(mechanical industry), have experienced decline since the mid
1970s.  In  the chapters  that  follow, we examine government
policies and other  factors in  the labor market  that  may have
contributed to this unimpressive  performance.3
Labor Market Institutions and the
Industrial Relatiols  System
In  this  chapter  we  describe the  principal features  of  the
industrial labor market and the industrial relations system. The
modem anJ  traditional sectors differ widely  in terms of worker
earnings and  the governmental regulations concerning hiring,
layoffs, employment contracts  and  working conditions.  The
modem sector is, to a large extent, unionized, and it is subject to
a relatively rigid system of regulations; the traditional sector is
informal, operating on the basis of market forces and traditions.
The  modem-sector labor  market  institutions are  in  many
respects  similar  to  those  of  other  French-speaking African
countries.  The trade union movement is weak and closely  linked
to the government.'  Industrial relations are to a large degree
governed by Senegal's 1961 Labor Code and several subsequent
legal provisions. 2 The  1961 code closely resembles the  1952
French Overseas Labor Code and grants considerable authority
to  the government and its  agencies.  The code greatly limits
employers' discretioin  over hiring, layoffs, form of employment
contracts, and working conditions.  In the case of trade unions, it
imposes permissible bounds on their activities.  The code also
provides general guidelines  for the process of wage determination.
The  code  is  supplemented  by  the  National  Collective
Agreement (NCA) of May  27, 1982,  which  was signed  by the main
trade union federation-Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs
du Senegal (CNTS)--the principal employer associations at the
time-Union Syndicale  des Industriels  (UNISYNDI),  Syndicat  des
Commercants, Importateurs et Exportateurs de l'Ouest Africain
1.  The weakness of unicns derives inter alia from their fragmentation,
poverty,  inefficienqc  of operation,  corruption  of middle-level  officials,  and the gulf
between  the leaders and the workers See Pfeffermann  (1968,  ch. 5) and Martens
(1982).
2. The references  in the text are to the May 1984  edition of the Labor  Code.14
(SCIMPEX),  and  Sydnicat des  Patrons  de  l'Ou st  Africain
(SYPAOA).  The NCA explains in greater detail tAe system of
industrial relations outlined by the code.
The three main actors on the labor scene are the government
(Ministry of  Public Affairs and  Labor), the  CNTS, and  the
employers' associations.  These three 'social partners' form the
so-called  Tripartite Commission,  which  determines (annually  since
1981) the rate of increase in the base wages (salaire de base) of
various professional (skill)  categories. The crucial  variable set by
the Tripartite Commission  is the minimum  industrial wage,  sare
minimum  interprofessionel  garanti (SMIG).  It  constitutes the
benchmark wage to which the wages  of higher-skilled  workers  and
employees  are  loosely  related.  Under  usual  practice,  the
Tripartite Commission  determines the new level of the SMIG and
a percentage increase in the basic salary  for each skill  group (e.g.,
7 percent for the most skilled workers, 15 percent for the least
skilled  workers  and  intermediate  percentage  increases  for
intermediate skill categories).  The terms of the accords of the
Tripartite Commission  are extended to all other sectors through
the Extension Decree.
An employee's base wage (salaire de base) can be augrnented
by various salary supplements (sursalaires) and bonuses (primes),
ranging from seniority and performance bonuses to benefits for
transportation and difficult of working  conditions (compensating
differentials).  The..stipjlements and  bonuses are  in principle
negotiated between trade unions and management, but in practice
the supplements are frequently determined by the employer, and
many bonuses are unilaterally predetermined by the Tripartite
Commission, NCA, or the government.  The supplements and
bonuses constitute a sizable part of total compensation (about 30
percent  for  unskilled  workers  and  up  to  80  percent  for
professionals  and managers) and they hence have a major impact
on the level of total earnings and the labor cost.
Despite the fact that worker earnings in Senegal are relatively
high by international standards, industrial relations continue to be
adversarial rather than cooperative in nature.  However, strike
activity is limited somewhat by the government regulation of
industrial relations which includes  compulsory  arbitration in case
of impasse. Historicaliy,  the trade unions have de jure operated15
as independent organizations. 3 However, in practice they are
closely  linked to the goverrnment,  and their views (e.g., on labor
market regulations) are reflected in the laws,  decrees and official
declarations.
A major aspect of Senegal's collective  bargaining is hence the
tripartite negotiation at the "highest level? of the government.
The work of the Tripartite Commission  is heavily influenced by
these  "high-level"  discussions.  The  next important  stage  of
bargaining occurs at the firm (plant) level where union stewards
(delegues de personnel) take up worker grievances  and negotiate
some  fringe  benefits.  Interestingly enough, the  worker  is
frequently expected  to share the grievance  compensation  with the
steward who helped win the case.
3.1  Specific  Institutional Aspects
This section describes  government  regulations  in four important
areas: hiring, employment contracts, layoffs, and wage setting.
These regulations impose the most binding constraints on the
functioning of the labor market  and are likely to  have major
efficiency  and welfare implications.
3.1.1 Hbing
Until late 1987  the orocess  of hiring was regulated by Articles
195-199  of the LaJ orCode.  These articles gave the government
monopoly  control over the hiring of workers by enterprises. The
Labor  Office (Service  de  la  Main-D'Oeuvre) of  the  State
Secretariat for Employment  was in charge of exercising  this legal
control through its central and regional bureaus.
Article 199 of the code declared the Labor Office to be the
only  intermediary  between  the  job  seekers  and  potential
employers and defined it as the referral service for workers of
all categories. All job seekers were thus expected  to register with
the Labor Office,  and employers  were legally  obliged to notify the
office of all vacancies in their firms.  Hiring of a worker was
legally  subject to a prior approval by the office. The existence of
private employment agencies or direct hiring by employers was,
until very recently, fcrbidden.
3.  For a detailed  institutional  anabsis of Senegal's  industrial  relations  in the
1950s,  1960s  and 1970s,  see Martens  (1982).16
In practice, the employer would notify the  Labor Office of
vacancies, and the office would supply several (usually  three or
four)  candidates  that  were  prescreened  on  the  basis  of
information supplied by the job  seekers and  the firm.  The
employer could keep  requestmng  additional candidates until a
suitable person was found for the job.  The entire process could
reportedly be rathe  time-consuming.
In 1987 a bill to eliminate the Labor Office's monopoly over
hiring, to permit direct matching  between  workers  and employers,
and to establish private employment agencies was introduced in
the National Assembly. The law was passed in 1988;  as a result,
direct  wor';er-employer  matching and  referrals  by  private
employment agencies are reportedly becoming more frequent.
3.1.2  Employment Contius
The Labor Code (primarily  Articles 34-38)  permits three types
of employment contracts: fixed-term,  seasonal and open-ended
('permanent").  The  fixed-term contract is  designed for  the
execution of specific tasks, and it legally  can last as little as one
day or as long as two years.  In order to encourage long-term
employment, the government has historically tried to limit the
employers' use of this type of contract.  In fact, Article 35 of the
Labor Code prohibits more than two fixed-term  contracts between
a given firm and worker_A  violation of this rule automatically
grants an open-ended contract to the worker. Seasonal  contracts
can be made repeatedly by employers  whose production contains
a sibniflcant  seasonal component. However,  abuse of the seasonal
contract also results in its automatic conversion into an open-
ended contract.
Estimates by the Ministry of Industry suggest that only about
10 percent of employees in the manufacturing  sector work under
seasonal contracts; the fraction of workers  with fixed contracts is
also reported to be very low. The official  estimates hence suggest
that the application of the Labor Code has succeeded in installing
the open-ended ("permanent")  contract as the principal form of
employment. However, as we show in Chapter 4, although this
official  picture is reflected in the ratio of the temporary workers'
wage bill to the total wage bill, it underestimates the number of
temporary workers that are used in any given year. The number
of  temporary  workers amounts to  almost 40 percent  of  the
permanent workers.17
As part of its attempt to reduce the rigidities of the modem.
sector labor market, the government in 1977  approved a bill that,
under  certain  conditions,  allows employers  to  exceed  the
limitation on fixed-term  contracts. The impact of this law is not
yet clear.
3.1.3 Layoffs
An employer's ability  to vary the size of the labor force through
layoffs is regulated primarily by Articles 45 to 47 of the Labor
Code.  In particular, economic  (as opposed to disciplinary)  layoffs
of workers with open-ended contracts must be approved by a
labor inspector on the basis of a well-prepared  file submitted by
the employer. The inspector examines  the evidence  to determine
whether the economic difficulties  experienced by the enterprise
in question are serious enough to warrant the requested layoffs.
Aticle  47 also stipulates that internal reorganization of the firm
may constitute a valid reason for layoffs,  but in practice employers
find this to be a difficult ground for justifying  layoffs.
The labor inspector has up to 45 days to approve or deny the
proposed layoff. This ruling can be appealed by either party to
the  Labor  Directorate  of the  Ministry of  Public Affairs and
Labor.  The decision of the Labor Directorate can in principle
be appealed to the Supreme Court; in practice, however,  it usually
represents the final verdict.
Layoffs of workers with fixed-term  contracts are possible only
if (1) the employer can prove a serious offense on the part of the
worker or (2) the employer  can show that the perfornance  of the
enterprise has been seriously  hampered by an 'act of nature" (e.g.,
fire).  Economic hardship brought about by a recession is hence
not a valid reason for laying  off workers  with fixed-term  contracts.
3.2  Wages, Bonuses,  and Supplements
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  Senegal's wage  setting  system
represents a mixture of tripartite and bilateral negotiations, as
well as unilateral actions on the part of e.mployers.  The increases
in the SNUG  and in the basic salary of each occupational (skill)
category  have been  determined  annually since  1981 by  the
Tripartite Commission. The increase in supplements  and bonuses
is determined in part  by the government,  in part by negotiations
between  trade  unions  and  management,  and  in  part  by18
management  alone.  In  the  case  of  an  impasse  in  the
management-union bargaining, the settlement is imposed by a
government  arbitrator.  The  compulsory arbitration  system
effectively  limits,  but does not eliminate,  strike (lock-out) activity.4
As mentioned earlier, total earnings are composed of a base
wage (salaire de base) and bonuses  and supplements  (primes and
sursalaires).  The bonuses and supplements often represent  a
sizable portion  of total  compensation, especially of the  more
educated employees. In fact the ratio of the basic salary to total
compensation decreases rapidly with a person's education and
professional qualification. With rare exceptions,  worker earnings
are  linked neither  to  individual or group productivity nor  to
enterprise  profitability.  The four  main bonuses received by
workers in addition to their basic salary are:
(1)  Snioritv  Bonus.  This bonus is determined by Article 45
of the NCA and is based on the workler's  length of service
with a given enterprise.  The amount is equal to 2 percent
of the worker's basic salary after two years of service, and
it increases by 1 percent each year up to twenty-five  years.
(2)  Overti  e and Ni bt Work Bonus. This bonus is accorded
by Article 44 of the NCA for (a) night work, (b)continuous
work of  10 hours, and (c) overtime work of 3 or more
hours.  The amoin  is equal to 3 times the hourly SMIG
per day.
(3)  Transportation Bonus.  This bonus is determined  by a
mixed employer-worker  commission  on the basis of Article
46 of the NCA.  In 1987-1988  it stood at 8,885 francs CFA
(African Financial Community)  per month (the cost of 95
trips on the first three sections of public bus transport).
(4)  Bonus for Dirq  Working  Conditions. This bonus is based
on  previous  NCAs and  it varies across industries and
professions.  It  is  provided to  workers who  do  not
automatically receive workclothes  from their employers. In
the  mechanical engineering sector the average bonus in
1987 stood at 4.675 francs CFA per month.
4.  For a discussion  of the nature and extent of strike activity  see Martens
(1982).19
Numerous other bonuses  exist. They raise significantly  the
basic  salary,  but very  few  of them  are  visibly  linked  to productivity
or other performance  indicators.4
Basic  Demographic,  Employment,
and Wage Statistics
Basic  statistics about population, structure of employment,  and
wage  level  are  important  for  understanding Senegal's labor
markets.  Moreover, they are also useful as background to the
analytical  work that follows  in Chapters 5-7.
4.1  Ihe  Demographic Situation
Demographic data for Senegal are derived primarily from the
1960.1961 and  1970-1971 demographic surveys, the  nadonal
census of  1976, the  fecundity survey of  1978, and  the  labor
migration survey  of 1979. The data are of varied quality, aind  the
statistics presented below should be used with caution.  (In 1987
Senegal undertook another national census, the results of which
should be available in 1990.)
According to  the data, Senegal's population increased from
4,589 million in 1972 to,6,038 million in 1982. The annual rate
of increase was a selAtively  high 2.9 percent during the 1972-1982
period, with the result that 53 percent of the population was less
than 20 years old in 1982. In 1982  the life expectancy  at birth was
48 years (47 for men and 49 for women), and the average number
of surviving children per family was estimated at 7.16-a  large
number resulting in part  from a  high incidence of polygamy.
National statistics indicate that in  1982, 32 percent of married
men were polygamous,  while 48 percent of married women were
members of polygamous  households. The incidence  of polygamy
may have actually risen over the past twenty years (see Chapter
7).
As we indicated in Chapter 2, moat of the modem industrial
activity is concentrated around Dakar.  As a  result, it  is not
surprising to find that  1,341  million people (22.2 percent of the
population) reside in the Cap-Vert region (which  contains Dakar)
and  that  the population density in  Cap-Vert is 75 times the
national average.22
42  Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment
The data on overall labor force participation, employment,  and
unemployment are perhaps the least reliable of the demographic
statistics.  We  report  the  official  data  for  the  sake  of
completeness,  but we prefer to place more emphasis on the data
from our enterprise and worker samples,  which we present in the
following  sections of this chapter.
As of 1982,  the number of people 10  years of age or older was
estimated to be 4,111 million,  of whom  2,274 million  (55 percent)
were  less than  30 years  old.  The  labor force  in  1982 was
estimated at 2,917  million, of whom 359,000  (12.3 percent) were
classified  as unemployed  (where unemployed  is defined as persons
not gainfully  employed and looking for work).
Over  one-half of  the  employed population  works in  the
traditional  rural  sector.  The  breakdown of  employment by
sectors, as reported by the Ministry of Planning for 1982 is:
Modem sector  905,000  (35 %)
Urban Informal sector  282,000  (11 %)
Traditional sector  1,371,000  (54 %)
Total  2,558,000  (100 %)
Within the  moderi- sctor,  317,000 of  those  employed are
reported  to  holepermanent  jobs, 494,000 hold seasonal jobs,
15,000 are cassified  as  daily workers, and 79,000 work on  a
temporary or  occasional basis.  The  striking aspect of  these
statistics  is, the  large  number  of  nonpermanent  (especially
easonal) workers relative to the permanent ones.  This finding
runs counter to many widely held beliefs, and it is corroborated
by data  from  our  industrial sample.  In  contrast, within the
informal sector a surprisingly  large number of workers (223,00G
out of 282,000)  is classified as permanent.  Given the nature of
this sector, the definition of a permanent worker is presumably
different - probably meaning any worker who engaged in any
informal sector activity for an extended period of time.
The  official breakdown  of  total  employment in  1982 by
agriculture and resource extraction,  industry,  and services  suggests
that a sizable portion of employment in the modern sector (as
classified above) is nonindustrial.  In  particular, the  primary23
sector  is  reported  to  account  for  743  percent  of  total
employment, whereas the secondary and tertiary sectors account
for  5.1 percent  and 20.6 percent, respectively.  Total modem
sector emplovment therefore appears to be almost seven times
the employment in industry (35 percent of the total vs.  5.1 percent
of the total).  A notable feature is the large size of the public
sector (15.5 percent in 1980).
The unemployment problem appears to be most serious in the
predominantly urban area of Cap-Vert. The 1979  labor migration
survey,  for example,  reported that the unemployment  rate in Cap-
Vert was 19.4 percent; the national average stood at 6.8 percent
in that year.  Moreover, Cap-Vert was the only region in which
the unemployment rate exceeded the national average, according
to the official data.
TABLE 41
Senega:  Urban Labor Fofce, 1960  -190
Number  of Workers  Parentage of
(in thousands)  labor  force
1960  1970  1976  1980  1960  1980
Moden  Seocor  53-1122.4  1587  1955  3S5  343
Productive Sector  42.2  60.6  869  107.1  16.7  18.
AgricuL  & Fishing  1.5  49  5.7  85  0.6  1.5
Nfanufacturing  11.6  15.0  20.8  23.6  4.6  4.1
Public Sector'  46.1  61.8  71.7  88.4  183  LS5
Informa  Sectori  147.0  205.2  2411  275.7  582  484
Openly  Unemployed  17.2  41.1  69.8  96.9  6B  173
Urban Labor Force  252.5  368.8  469.6  570.1  100.0  100.0
*  Ciil  Service and Non-Commercial  Public  Enterprises.
*  Presumably  calculated  as a residual. Ihe source  does not identiry  methodology.
Source: Statistical  Directorate, Ministy of Finance,  Senegal.
The urban unemployment  problem is also underscored  in Alain
Mingat's 1982  study. Table 4.1, which  is assembled  from Mingt's24
study, indicates that urban employment  and unemployment both
increased  between  1960  and  1980, but  that  the  level  of
unemployment increased much faster  thIan did  the  level  of
employment.  The  study  also  suggests that  formal  sector
employment  increased faster than did employment  in the informal
sector.  This finding challenges the traditional beliefs of most
outside economic observers, but it is not clear what Mingat's
source for informal sector data is.  Bloch  (1985) also figures and
attributes them to the Statistical Directorate of the Ministry of
Finance.  He presumes that employment  in the informal sector
is calculated as a  residual because no methodology could be
identified.  Our attempts to gather basic data on the informal
sector lead us to conclude that the informal sector is one of the
least understood activities in Senegal's  economy  and that data on
this  sector must  be  treated  with extreme caution.  It  is  for
instance likely that the unemployed are effectively part of the
informal sector, although statistical  information on this aspect of
unemployment is scant.
4.3 Industrial Employment  in the Modern Sector
As Table 4.2 indicates, the number of modem secto'r industrial
firms appears to have increased sharply from 1963 to 1977, but
has remained about the ssme since  then. However,  it is not clear
whether the definitioii of the modern sector remained the same
from 1963 to  1977; if not, the major increase in the number of
firms  during  that  period  may be  somewhat spurious.  The
definition  during the past ten years has, in contrast, been uniform.
Under  this definition, a  firm is considered to  be  part  of the
modem sector if it can be reached by the tax authorities.  The
important point is that even relatively small firms (e.g., with a
dozen workers) are included. The data from 1977 to  1984 are
hence  fairly reliable.  Further, they indicate that  the  much-
discussed exodus of French entrepreneurs has not resulted in a
significant  decrease in the number of industrial enterprises.  Our
inquiries in this area suggest  that most departing expatriates have
been selling their  firms to  other expatriates or  to  Senegalese
nationals.  By the same token, it should be noted that there has
not been any growth in the total number of modern sector firris.25
TABLE  42
Senega  Number  of Mod1mSeo  Iobimd  FPm
1963  1977  1980  1984
Food  30  120  106  102
Groundnut Processing  7  6  6  2
TextdLeandFootwear  19  18  23  26
Woodware  and Packaging  7  21  14  16
Chemicals  7  28  36  38
Metal Engineering  22  30  35  44
Construction  Materials  6  7  3  6
TOTAL  98  230  223  234
Source: Pfeffermann  (1968,  p. 4) for 1963. Direction  de la Staistique for  977,
1980  and 1984.'
4.3.1 Employment of Pemanent Workers
Table  43  provides  the  official data  on  employment  of
permanent workers,by  ifiiustry since 1977. Total manufacturing
employmnent  remained roughly  constant between 1977 and 1982,
(nearly 27,000), but it increased by about 2,000 jobs during the
slight  economic recovery of  1984.  Generally, the  modern
industrial sector has not been a major creator of permanent jobs,
although the  overall stagnation disguises any variation across
individual  industries. In particular,  textles, clothing,  and  leather,
wood, paper, and construction are among the industries whose
level of permanent employment  has decreased, whereas printing,
chemicals, and mechanical industry substantialy increased their
employment of permanent workers since 1977. This finding is
curious given that production in the former group (excluding
construction) grew more rapidly than the average during this
period while production in chemicals and mechanical industry
declined. (See Table 2.3.)
Before attempting to  explain this striking phenomenon, we
present similar data for a sample of 80 industrial enterprises. The
sample, which we  designed jointly with officials in  Senegal's26
Ministry of Finance, accounts for about 70 percent of permanent
employment and 80 percent of value-added in all modem sector
industrial firms.  It includes virtually  all larpe firms and a great
number of the small ones.  It is hence designed to capture the
entire  size distnbution of modem sector firms, but it naturally
undersamples  the  numerous  small enterprises.  In  terms  of
sectoral  coverage, the  sample includes 24 firms  in  the  food
industry,'  18 firms in the chemical and extraction industries, 13
firms in the mechanical (machinery  and equipment) industry, 11
firms in the textile, clothing and leather industry, 10 firms in the
paper and wood industry, and 4 firms in other industrial groups
TABLE  4.3
Senea  Toal Empkymt  of
Pinnmnent  Wodm  by Inbntry
1977  1982  1984
Food  13,188  13,722  13,961
Tobacco and Matches  546  466  518
Textiles  Clothing6,1  5.0517
and  Leather  613  S,OOO  S,157
Wood  936  268  304
Paper  275  404  206
Printing  402  371  496
Chemicals  1,69S  2,796  3,138
Construaion  829  753  544
Mechanical  Industries  2,313  2,942  4,55S
TOTAL  26,697  26,722  28,879
Source: Direction de la Statistique  for 1977,  1982  and 1984.
1.  The food industy is composed  of the following  sub-industries:  sugar, oil,
fish,  flour, and  other food.27
(matches and tobacco, etc.). The sample covers the period from
1980 to  1985 but some data were not available for 1985. As a
result, we present data for both 1984 and 1985 as two different
endpoints  that  can  be  used  in  assessing the  evolution  of
employment in the sample.  We should also mention that  our
sample data tend, in fact, to be more accurate than the official
data because firms occasionally  do not distinguish  clearly  between
permanent  and  temporary  workers in  their  reports  to  the
government.
As the data in Table 4.4 indicate, permanent employment in
the sampled enterprises as a whole  grew  very slightly  in the 1980s.
Moreover, our sample data indicate that the discrepancies  in the
employment and output trends are not as striking as the official
TABLU  4.4
S-Ngal  Employnant  of Penn  t Woiran  by Imlstry
1  the Entetpdw Simpl
198G  1982  1984  1985
JO
Food  9,980  10.181  9,886  10,072
Tobacco and Matches  .U7  466  512  476
Textfles,  Clothing  and'
Leather  4,540  4,641  4,568  4,655
Wood  236  205  230  211
Paper  297  401  371  374
Printing  93  191  115  113
Chemicals  1,279  1,690  1,673  1,455
Construction  597  634  474  449
Mechanical  Industries  1,491  1,950  Z188  1,988
TOTAL  8,988  20,359  20,017  19,793
Source:  Enterprise sanple28
data suggest.  The percentage increases in employment within
the chemical and mechanical industries, for instance, are much
smaller  than  those  found  in  the  official industry  statistics
presented in Table 4.3. In recent (1982-1985)  years, the chemical
industry  in  fact  employed  fewer  permanent  workers, while
employment in the mechanical industry rose slightly  during this
period.  Our data also indicate that, contrary to the official  data
in Table 4.3, employment of permanent workers in the textie,
clothing and leather industry actually increased during the 1980-
1985 period.  Finally, some of the discrepancies between the
output  and  employment  trends  can  be  attributed  to  the
differential use of temporary workers by industries over time.
For instance, as Table 4.6 demonstratc.. the food industry has
significantly  increased its reliance on temporary workers in the
1980s.
4.3.2 Employment  of Temporary  Workers
Because the population and hence the labor force have been
growing rapidly, the overall stagnation of permanent industrial
employment is  clearly a  cause  for  concern.  One  possible
explanation' of  the  phenomenon  is  that  entrepreneurs  have
increasingly relied  on  temporary  workers  as  a  means  of
maintaining  labor-input  flexibility in  the  presence  of  rigid
government enforcementof  permanent employmeint.  Tables 4.5
and 4.6 present tata  from the sampled firms on the number of
temporary  workers in  various industries and  their wage bills
relative to the wage bills of permanent workers.
As Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show, the number of temporary workers
employed in the industrial sector is approximately  40 percent of
the number of permanent workers and seems to have remained
fairly constant over the first half of the 1980s.2  There is, however,
some fluctuation, which supports the managers' statements that
they are using temporary workers as a way to adjust their labor
cost to cyclical  market conditions.
The  number of  temporary workers is,  of  course,  a  good
measure of how many individuals have at one time or another
2.  The figures  for the food industry  exclude  one flour mill,  which appears  to
have reported unreasonable  data (when compared zo the other flour mills and
other firms in the sample). Specifically,  the numbers  given  were 13,200  temporary
workers in 1980,  20 in 198Z 547  in 1983,  13,824  in 1984  and 700 in 1985.29
TABLE  45
SaeepL  Employmai of Teymp  y Wotdn  by 1hAsy
inthe  Enzcrpdaesample
1980  1982  1984  1985
Food  2,107  5,490  8,001  4,615
Tobacco andMatches  62  241  0  77
Textiles,  Clothing  and
Leather  519  704  629  752
Wood  1  9  S  17
Paper  51  12  61  73
Prnting  28  S3  51  40
Chemicals  5,140  312  212  226
construction  83  139  101  ,86
Mechanical  Industries  279  264  205  204
TOrAL  8,270  7,224  9,265  6,090
Source: Enterprise sample.
worked on a temporary basis. Although this number is a useful
indicator of worker welfare, the extent of on-the-job training and
the breadth of modern sector employment,  it does not distinguish
between short vs. long spels of temporary employment.  Table
4.6 shows the relative use of permanent and  temporary labor
input by firms by presenting the labor cost of temporary workers
relative to that of permanent workers in the sampled firms. The
data indicate that the wage bill allocated to temporary workers in
each industry is relatively  small when compared to the wage bill
of permanent workers-on the order of 5 percent to 12  percent for
most  industries.  Hence,  the  actual  number  of  days  each
temporary laborer  is employed is quite  small relative to  the30
number of days worked by each permanent worker.  However,
there is some indication that the use of temporary workers has
been increasing. The proportion of the temporary wage bill to the
permanent wage bill doubled from 1980  to 1984. Moreover, since
temporary workers receive few fringe benefits, their wage bilL
relative to the wage bill of permanent workers, underestimates
their relative use.
TABLE  46
Seneqpl Ratio of Total  Wage  Bl  of Tanpoay  Workers
to Total Wagp  Bi  of Permanent  Workers
in the Enterprise  Sample
1980  1982  1984  1985
Food  0.05S  0.129  0.197  0.163
Tobacco an  Matches  0.055  .025  0.053  0.041
Tcxtiles  0.062  0.118  0.068  0.110
Wood  0.112  0.080  0.048  0.049
Paper  0.039  0.006  0.050  0.053
Prindng  0.121  0.069  0.193  0.103
chemicals  0.046  0.025  0.031  0.032
Constuction  0.078  0.115  0.149  0.116
Mechanical  Industries  0.023  0.032  0.030  0.026
AVERAGE  0.051  0.087  0.116  0.103
Source: Enterprise  sample31
4.3.3 Nanonal Composition  of Employment
Senegal's labor force is usually classified by nationality into
Senegalese nationals (Senegalese), nationals of  other African
countries (other Africans), and citizens of non-African  countries
(non-Africans).  Other Africans are for the most part nationals
of other French speaking, West African countries. The majority
of non-Africans are French citizens.  The Syro-Lebanese also
form an important economic  group, although their impact is often
underestimated  in  official statistics  because  many  of  Syro-
Lebanese are Senegalese or French citizens.
Of  major  policy interest  is  whether  the  official policy of
Senegalization  has succeeded in increasing the employment  share
of  the  Senegalese nationals.  Although growth in  productive
employment  would be preferable overall, in its absence it is likely
that an increase in employment of Senegalese nationals within a
stagnant total labor force would be seen as a positive outcome
from the national welfare standpoint. 3
The first point to be noted is that temporary workers in the
industrial sector appear to be predominantly Senegalese. This is
clearly the case in enterprises that break down their temporary
worker statistics by national groups.  Other enterprises do not
identify temporary workers by national group, but our' interviews
suggest that  in  these  cases the  temporary workers are  also
primarily Senegalese. Hence, as much as one-third of Senegalese
employment  in the,industrial sector is characterized by temporary
work and low pay (presumably reflecting  the short average job
duration and possibly  lower wages).
The statistics in Table 4.7 indicate that the share of Senegalese
in permanent industrial employment increased steadily from 87
percent in 1962  to 97.6  percent in 1985. During the same period
the share of other Africans decreased from 4.7 to 0.7 percent,
while that of non-Africans  (primarily French) feUl  from 8.3 to 1.7
percent.  These  data  reflect  a  significant substitution  of
Senegalese workers for non-Senegalese  since independence. At
the same time, the share of Senegalese clearly rise much more,
3.  This  of course is clearly  the case if the skills  of the displaced  foreigners  are
identical  or inferior  to those of the incoming  Senegalese  workers.  However,  if the
displaced  foreigners  are job-creating  individuals  (e.g., entrepreneurs),  the process
of Senegalization  could result  in a decrease  of Senegalese  employment  from what
it would have been in its absence.  This issue is addressed in Chapter 6.32
and future increases in the employment of Senegalese nationals
will have to come from new employment. Unfortunately, aside
from the  1980-1982  period, little permanent employment was
generated for the Senegalese  in the first half of the 1980s. As the
data  in Table 4.8 show, the number of permanent Senegalese
workers in the sampled firms increased from 18,266  in 1980 to
19,653  in 1982  but has been decining slightly  since then.
TABLH  4.7
Smp:*  NoalCoipouiton
of Total Induaral  Employment
1963  1975  1980  1984  1985
Senegalese  87.0%  93.0%  96.0%  97.1%  97.6%
Other Africans  4.7%  23%  1.2%  09%  0.7%
Non-Afican  83%  4.7%  2.8%  2.0%  1.7%
TOTAL  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  P 100.0%
Source: Pfeffermann  (19§8Y  fbf`1963  and Svqjnar  (1984)  for 1975.  Enterprise
sample for 1980,  1984rand 1985
TABLE 4.8
Se.eal  Empl:ment  of Pemanet  Seealew
Wouas  by  1duty  in the  lnzeqmsi Sample
Industly  1980  1982  1984  1985
Food  9,546  9,852  9,618  9,837
Tobacco and Matches  541  453  S00  465
Textilcs,  Clotwing
and Leather  4,424  4,523  4,460  4,594
Wood  222  192  219  20033
Paper  265  371  354  358
Prting  85  183  108  105
Cheadcals  1,210  1,617  1,606  1,404
Constuction  570  606  453  430
Mechanical  Industries  1,403  1A56  2,103  1,916
TOTAL  18,266  19,653  19,421  19,309
Source: Enterprise sample for 1980,  1982,  1984,  and 1985.
Tables  4.9  and  4.10  depict  the  evolution  of  the  skill
(occupational)  structure  of  the  employed Senegalese,  non-
Africans, and other Africans, from 1975  to 1985. The Senegalese
have been experiencing substantial upward mobility. Their
TABLE  49
SenpaL Numbe  of Upper L.vd Mana  by Natonl  Groups
G3roup  1980  1984  1985
Senegalese  91  111  209  230
Other Africans  11  4  1  3
Non-Africans  280  237  200  190
Source: Svejnar  (1984)  for 1975.  Enterprise  sample for 1980,  1984,  and 198S.
representation  in  the  workers and  apprentices category  has
decreased,  and  their. numbers  among  the  skilled  workers,
technicians, and miedle management categories have increased
significantly.  As Tabie  4.9 demonstrates,  the  Senegalese  have  also
become  much  more  numerous  among  the  managers,  having
replaced  non-Africans  as  the  dominant  group  in  1984.  Non-
Africans  bave  virtuatly  disappeared  from  the  workers  and
apprentices  group  (Table  4.10),  and  they  have  also  drastically34
reduced their presence among skilled workers, and technicians.
About one-half (190 in 1985) of the remaining non-African  falls
into  the  top  management  category,  and  38  percent  (142
individuals) are top  technicians and middle managers.  Other
Africans, whose presence is now minimal, are primarily found
among the workers and technicians.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 imply that there  has been a  significant
upgrading of the permanently employed labor force, with the
unskilled workers and apprentices  becoming much  less numerous
over time.  This is indeed the case, and it in part attests to an
improvement in the quality of the permanent labor force, with
temporary workers presumably  being used more intensively  in the
unskilled wo:ker group.  However,  part of the structural change
is spurious because employers admit to yielding to worker and
trade union pressure to reclassify  workers even if these workers
lack the corresponding skills.  Part  of the  change, therefore,
simply  reflects  reclassifications that  correlate  strongly with
seniority but  not necessarily with a corresponding increase in
human capital.  Finally, as we wiU  discuss in Chapter 5, a major
complaint about  the functioning of Senegal's industrial labor
market  is  the  perceived decline in  the provision of  training
(apprenticeships) by firms.  If  significant, this  decline could
explain the overall decrease in the number of individuals  found in
the workers and apprentices category.
4A Earnings
4.4.1 Components  of Total Compensation
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  employee compensation in  the
modern sector usually  consists of the base wage or salary (salaire
de  base),  wage supplement (sursalaire), and  various bonuses
(primes).  The employer also pays social security contributions,
which are levied on the wage bill, and often also pensions. The
base wage and some of the bonuses (e.g., those for seniority and
transportation) are determined by the Tripartite Commission  or
through bargaining,  whereas the wage supplement  and some other
bonuses (e. g., productivity rewards) are frequently determined
unilaterally by the employer.35
TABLB  4.10
Scmepk Compadom of Pmuit
Bmpkwrtn  by  Skl  Group
Group  1975  1980  1984  1985
A.  S.ew
Top Management  0.9  05  1.0  1.1
Top Technicians  and  1.S  23  2.6  2.7
'Middle  Management
Technicians  and  165  16.8  21.5  22.0
Skilled Workers
Workers and  81.1  80.2  74.9  72.2
Apprentices
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
F'
B.  Non-icns
Top Management  _14S  40.2  463  50.9
Top Technicians  and  23A  34.0  36.0  38.1
Middle Management
Technicians  and  27.6  20.7  14.5  10.7
Skilled Workers
Workers and  6.5  S.0  3.2  03
Apprentices
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
C.  Other Afrin
Top Management  1.8  1.7  1.1  1.9
Top Technicians  and  2.3  3.1  3.9  4.5
Middle Management
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Group  1975  1980  1984  1985
Technicdans  and  23.8  13.5  23.8  16.0
Skilled  Workers
Workers  and  71.1  81.7  71.3  77.6
Apprendces
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Svejnar (1984)  for 1975. Enterprise sample  for 1980,1984,  and 1985.
Although  knowledge  of  the  impoitarice  of  base  wages,
supplements, and bonuses in total compensation  is indispensable
for  understanding enterprise  performance and formulation of
public policy,  no systematic  information  existed or could  be easily
obtained  on  this  subject.  Therefore,  we  administered  a
questionnaire  to  a  stratified  random  sample  of  workers,
technicians, and managers (612 in total) in a 17-firm  subsample
of  our  larger  (80-firm) sample.  Our  analysis of  earnings
composition  and determinants is based on information  from these
interviews.
As can be seen from.columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.11, the ratio
of  base  wage  tQ, t6ial  compensation decreases rapidly with
increasing education and professional standing. As reflected by
the employee survey data, the base wage forms 67 percent of a
typical  laborer's or unskilled  worker's  total compensation,  but only
24 percent of the high level manager's total compensation.  In
order to provide a better understanding  of this phenomenon, we
calculated  the  proportions  of  total  compensation that  are
comprised of bonuses and wage  supplements,  as shown in columns
3 and 4 of Table 4.11. The resulting  proportions demonstrate that
wage supplements,  rather than bonuses,  are primarily  responsible
for increasing  the gap between base wage and total compensation
as  the  employee's  skill  and  education  increase.  Wage
supplements represent  44.9 percent  of  the  typical high level
manager's total compensation but only 6.2 percent of the typical37
TALE  4.11
Sanegak A  pag  Mo-  Be  and Todal  CG  _pauo  By
SkM  Cates  in 17 FE,  I66
Prcent  of TotU
Compnaton
Compensation  Comprised  of
Wagr
Category  Baso  Toad  Bonuses Supplement
High-level








level managers  78,289  160,198  25.8%  16.5%
Sled  employees  58,292  110,906  293%  ,  11.0%
Skled  workers
and unskied
employees  *46469  77,642  26.5%  7.9%
Laborers and
unskilled  workers  38,258  56,963  22.7%  6.2%
Source: Authors'  rvq  of workers  in 17 firms
laborer's and unskilled worker's compensation.4 ln contrast,  the
variance in bonus percentages across skil  categories is rather
small-18  percent  to  29 percent.  Bonuses are,  however, an
increasingly  important component of total compensation  for the
lower skill groups, rising up to one-third, leveling  off, and then
falling for the upper two skill groups.
4.  Incidentally,  the wage  supplement  is also creatng a larger wedge  between
the average earnings of the top and the low level sklm  categories. Whereas  the
ratio of the base salary of high level managers  to laborer and unskilled  workers
is 3.3, the same ratio using  total compsion  is 9.1.38
Our interviews  with enterprise managers also suggest  that wage
supplements have become more important as base wages began
to fall relative to inflation. This development  is important for two
reasons:  First, from an  analytical standpuint we clearlY must
include supplements and fringe benefits in order  to  obtain  a
realistic picture of the evolution  of worker earnings. Second, the
preeminence of wage supplements in recent years has greatly
decreased union influence on wages because many supplements
are granted and adjusted at the employer's discretion.
4.4.2 Evoluion of Wages  by Skill Groups
Because base wages have been changed infrequently by the
Tripartite Commission,  the evolution  of base wages  has been very
discontinuous. Percentage increases in base wages have tended
to be related to the price increases of basic commodities,  and the
adjustments have generally  favored low-income  workers.
Data on the evolution of base wages suggest that, while in the
past wages tended  to  catch up with inflation, since 1975 real
wages have fallen significantly.  For  example, Bloch's (1985)
calculation of the real minimum  wage (real SMIG) suggests  that
it declined from an index value of 100 in 1975  to 90 in 1980  and
76 in 1984. Our calculations indicate that it decreased further, to
70 in 1985 and 66 in 1986.
Our data from the worker sample and data compiled by the
Directorate of Labor tell the same story.  The Directorate of
Labor  data  on  the  evolution of  the  base  wages of  various
categories of workers between November 1974 and April 1983
indicate that the cumulative  percentage increase ranged between
70 and 83 percent for the unskilled  workers and between 35 and
45 percent for the professionals of the highest category. During
the same period, the African and European cost of living  indices
registered increases of  107 and  114 percent, respectively, thus
substantially  exceeding  the rise in the base wages of all categories.
The survey data  on workers in  17 enterprises, presented  in
Table  4.12, indicate  that  average annual growth of the  total
compensation  (measured  as  base  wage  plus  bonuses  and
supplements) in nominal terms was 6.55 percent a year over the39
1984.1986  period. 5 The average annual growth of the base wage
over these years was 4.18  percent. Given that the rate of inflation
(as measured by the cost of living index) was approximately 13
percent  a year from 1984 to 1986,  it is dear  that the industril
wage (in terms of the base or tot;l) has not been keeping up with
the cost of living.
Table 4.12 also examines the growth of total compensation by
its principal components within the major skill categories found
TABLE  4.12
Senegal Average  Annual Percentage  Growth  of Nominal  Monthy
Compensadon  by Skill  Category, 19841986
Bae  TtO
Categoiy  Wage  Bonuses  Supplements  Compenaon
(%)  (%g)  (%)  (%)
High level manager  6.87  3.08  51.80
Upper-level  technicians  17.76
and middle  level managers  5.35  7.11  16.43  JO
Mliddle-level  technicians
and lower level managers  2.89  8.51  15.59
5.48
Skilled employees  - 1.96  8.53  11.16
Skled  workers and
unskiled employees  2.63  10.16  8.19
3.50
Laborers  and unskilled
workers  7.28  14.11  6.33
Average  Annual Growth  4.18  9.90  12.88  655
Source: Survey  of workers  in 17 firms.
5.  Mhis  time period is, of course,  a short time period for drawing  conclusions
about wage trends. However,  because  the data come from worker surves, they
represent a useful complement  to our other data.40
in the 17 firm sample. Our data from the 17 firm sample give a
somewhat  different picture than those of the Directorate of Labor
in that (during the 1984-1986  period) the average growth of the
base wage of laborers and unskiled workers  is not much (if at all)
higher than that  of  high level managers.  This difference in
findings suggests that occupational difri-rences  in wage growth
may have moderated in recent (1984-1986)  years in comparison
to the earlier (1974-1983)  period.
Nevertheless, from Table 4.12 it is clear that, because of the
relatively rapid growth of the supplements  of the two higher skill
groups (especially the high-level  managers), the average growth
of total compensation  has in recent years been substantially  higher
for the upper level technicians  and middle to high level managers
than  for  the  two  lowest skill groups-17.76 percent  a  year
compared  to  3.5 percent  a year.  Hence, our data  from the
subsample of 17 firms suggest that in the 1984-1986  period, the
total compensation of the highest category of labor was keeping
abreast of the cost of living  whle that of the low  level worker was
falling behind.
4.4.3 Evolution  of Total Compensaion by  National
and Skill Groups
Table 4.13  presents data from the large (80-enterprise) sample
on the average compensation  of the three National groups within
four skill categoris-  r  i i980, 1984,  and 1985. The data reflect the
total  cnmpensation of  employees (including employer social
security contnbutions)  as  reported  by  employers in  the  80
sampled firms.  In contrast to  the 17-firm sample, these data
come from employer records and they cover a longer time period
as well as a larger group of employees. Like the data from the
17-firm  sample, the 80 firm data in Table 4.13 indicate that total
employee compensation has not risen as rapidly as the cost of
living in the 1980s.
Table 4.13 also provides information  about differentials in total
compensation among  the  three  national groups.  The  table
demonstrates that the growth in the compensation of different
categories of workers  was not uniform  across the national groups.
The compensation  of non-African  employees  has outstripped that
of  Senegalese and  other  African employees in  almost  every
category  and  has  thus  slightly  increased  the  substantial
differentials between the  compensation of  non-Africans and41
Africans.  For example,  the average  compensation  of non-African
top managers  rose by 65 percent,  whereas  that of Seneplese top
managers  rose by 59 percent, over the 1980-1985  penod.  This
differential  growth  rate increased  the already  sizable  ratio of the
average  compensation  of non-African  to Senegalese  top  managers
from 2.5 to 2.6. While  comparable  data for earlier periods are
not readily  available,  it should  be noted that the above  evolution
in relative  managerial  compensation  is probably  quite favorable
for tae Senegalese  by historical  standards.
TABLE 4.13
Sengal:  Avcnge Annual Comnston  Per Employee
by National and bi  Groups
A. 1980
SEN ALESE  QOTHER  AMR  KN--AM
Top Technicians  5,013  10,210  12,S95
Top Tochnicians  and
Mfiddle  Management  2,767  2,268  9,167
TechniCians  and
Skillcd Workers  1,43S  1,232  5,949
Workers  and
Apprentices  581  656  774
...  ....  ....  .........  . ..............................................
B.  1984
SENEGALESE  THER AP  !  NON-AFIL
Top Management  7,751  6,774  19,199
Top Technicians  and
Middle  Management  4,125  4,707  12,943
Technicians  and
Skilled  Workers  1,680  1,665  9,062
Workers and
Apprentices  855  833  655
(Continued)42
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C. 198S
im  ~~~SENEGALESE  OTrHER  AFR.  NON-AFRr
Top Management  7,972  6,130  20,812
Top Technicians  and
Mfiddle  Management  4,474  4,431  15,437
Technicians  and
Skilled  Workers  1,677  1,993  11,624
Workers and
Apprentices  950  855  410
Values are in 1,000  of Francs  CFA.
Source: 80 Enterprise sample
The more striking case is the growth in average compensation
of non-African technicians and skilled workecs (95 percent)  as
compared to that of similarly  skilled Senegalese  (36 percent) and
other Africans (62 percent).  In this category of workers, this
diversity  in compensation increases led to a jump in she ratio of
the non-African earnings to Senegalese earnings from 4.8 to 6.9
and in the ratio of non-African  to other African  earnings from 4.8
to 5.8 between 1980 and-1985.  Hence, although Senegalization
in  the  labor market  has  taken  place in  terms of  increased
employment of the Senegalese in more skilled positions, the gap
between the per  employee compensation of non-Africans and
Senegalese has been widening. It should be noted, however,  that
because of the substantial exodus of the non-Africans,  the mean
compensation  per employee  in the two lowest  skill  groups may be
quite sensitive to the characterist'-s of the few remaining non-
African workers.  Moreover, an evaluation of the merits of the
emerging earnings  differentials would require information on the
relative productivity  of individuals  in the three national groups.5
Labor  Market Regulations,
Industrial Relations,
and Enterprise Performance
In  this chapter  we analyze qualitatively the effects of labor
regulations and  the  industrial relations  system on  enterprise
performance. Our approach is institutional,  and it relies primarily
on  the  information gathered  during  our  interviews with the
government officials,  employers and the representatives of their
associations, and workers and their trade union representatives.
5.1 The Position of Govenmnent  Officials
The government officials  that are most directly  involved  in the
labor market are  those in  the Ministty of Public Affairs and
Labor.  Within this ministry, they are located primarily in the
Directorate of Employment and the Directorate of Labor.  Tht
staff in these directorates is composed  of professionals with legal
and various social science backgrounds. It includes researchers,
administrators, and labor inspectors. The labor inspectors  are in
charge of examining  employment and compensation practices in
individual firms and ensuring that they conform to  the Labor
Code and other regulations.
Because philosophically  the government is in a loose alliance
with  the  cooperating trade  union, CNTS,I most  government
officials are in the position of trying  to promote an environment
that  allows for  the  protection  of  workers'  interests  without
endangering the  existence of firms.  Until very recently, the
government relied on labor market regulations as an essential
means for furthering this goal.  The  interventionist approach
1. There are also  more  radical  trade unions  that consider  collective  bargaining
in the tripartite framework  to be  inconsistent  with class struggle and the true
nussion  of trade unionism.  Tlese unions  denounce  CNTS  and refuse to cooperate
with the government. See also Martens (1982).44
followed naturally  from  the  French  system  and  has  been
perpetuated through recruitment of Ministry  staff primarily from
the legal profession. With the onset of the New Industrial Policy
in the mid-1980s,  the government  has gradually  searcbed for ways
of  alleviating the  regulatory burden with the  double aim  of
enhancing enterprise flexbility and preserving  workW' welfare.
In  practice,  government policy has  been  reflected in  the
numerous  regulations and  recent  deregulations discussed  in
Chapter 3. At present, government  offlciaLr  are still apprehensive
about  undertaking major  reforms  of  tict  industrial relations
system, although they have concluded  a major study in this area
under a World Bank contract. 2 Discussions  with official- at all
levels revealed a continuing mistrust of enterprise policies and a
fear  that  reforms  might disrupt  the  fragile  balance  in  the
adversarial union-management  relationship.
As regards specific  regulations  on hiring,  employment  contracts,
layoffs, and wage setting, most government  officials  now  feel that
hiring need not be  tightly regulated and  that direc: matching
between workers and firms should be encouraged. However,  they
maintain  that  enterprises  now have sufficient flexibility with
respect to employment  contracts and layoffs  and that loosening of
the current rules would  have a negative  impact  on worker welfare.
In particular, officials claim that the use of temporary workers
provides  sufficient flexbility  for  firms and  that  government
processing of employer requests for layoffs  is rapid and frequently
leads to  approval.  In addition, most officials see the existing
minimum  wage regulation  as basically  ineffectual  because the cost
of living has in  recent years risen faster than the SNUG and
because  rrany  salary supplements continue to  be  determined
unilaterally by the employer or bilaterally  between the employer
and  the union.  In sum, the government officials dealing with
labor issues believe  that the burden of improving  the performance
of Senegal's enterprises falls on neither the government nor the
workers, but rather on the managers.
2. See Delegation  a rlInsertion  a la Reinsenion  at a l'Emploi  (1988).45
52 Manve  Views
Our interviews with employer representatives  and managers in
the 17 firms in our sample indicate that the vast majority of them
are dissatisfied with the Labor Code and the system of labor
relations in SenegaL  Most managers feel that the regulations
prevent  them  from  making  efficient  decisions and,  more
importantly, that they reduce the motivation and productivity  of
the workers.  They regard the low levels of education, discipline,
motivation and productivity of most workers as detrimental to
enterprise  performance and  to  the economic development of
Senegal in  general.  Although these sentiments were perhaps
stronger among the expatriate and Syro-Lebanese  managers, the
Senegalese managers shared these views as well.
5.2.1 Restrctive Labor Reguladons
As part of our interview process, we asked the managers to
identify the labor regulations that most restricted their economic
activities.  As  shown in Table 5.1, nearly two-thirds of those
managers surveyed identified the regulations on layoffs as being
the most binding.  Also mentioned, but by 15 percent or less of
the  sample, were:  1) the  regulations according daily workers
permanent status  if employed for more than four consecutive
days; 2) limits imposed on the length of contract that  can be
offered  to  new  expatriate  employees; and  3)  regulation of
overtime work.  Finally, the functioning of the Labor Service of
the Ministry of Public Affairs and Labor was also mentioned as
an important limitation on enterprise activity.
In  discussing their  problems, most managers expressed the
feeling that in many cases the Labor Service  was more a nuisance
than  a  constraint.  Almost all indicated that they often hire
workers they want and only subsequently  'regularize"  the workers'
status  with the  Labor  Service; however, the process was not
automatic and sometimes employers were required to interview
four or five people sent by the service  before they could hire the
workers they wanted.
In  order  to  assess  the  extent  to  which regulations affect
flexibility  in labor utilization, we asked the managers to identify
methods of adjusting their labor cost and the number of hours
worked during the business cycle.  Sighing and throwing up of
hands was  the  predominant  first response.  Some managers46
indicated  that  they  have  no  way of  adjusting because  the
workweek is fixed by the Labor Code at forty hours.  Most said
that  they use daily workers as a cushion or that they vary the
number of hours of overtime.  Only one manager said he used
subcontracting as a means of adjustment.
TABL  S.1
Smegat Mod Conamig  Labdor  Regution
Aconfig  to Managu
Percent of
Constraint  Total Sample
Regulations  on Layoff  61%
Regulation  of Daily Workers  15%
Regulation on Hiring Expatriates  15%
Labor Service  8%
Regulation of Overtime  Work  8%
Source: Authors' survey  of managers,  1986.
Are wages being set too high (or too low) relative to labor
productivity?  Most of the managers in our sample did not feel
that wages reflect worker productivity.  However, there is some
consensus that the wage of the expatriates is either equal to or
lower than  their  level of productivity and  that  the  wages of
unskilled workers are higher than or equal to their productivity.
When asked whether they would hire more labor if workers'
salaries were reduced by, for example,  20 percent, 91 percent of
the managers responded that they would not.  Some managers
also added that the wages of unskilled workers should not  be
lowered, as they are already at the Usocialy  acceptable  minimum"
in terms of basic needs.  Many stressed that the problem is not
high wages but rather poor effort, lack of worker discipline, and
low productivity.
5.2.2 Recndrument  and  hTining
We asked several questions about recruitment and learned that,
in generaL it is not difficult to hire the unskilled  and semi-skilled47
skilled workers at  current salaries; it  is, however, difficult to
recruit the higher-skilled  Senegalese  and non-African employees.
Managers cite as the principal obstacles the shortage of well-
trained Senegalese and the constraints  of existing  regulations that
make  it  less attractive for expatriates to  accept employment.
Salaries are not considered to be a problem. Interestingly,  similar
results are reported by Pfeffermann (1968) from his 1963  survey
of the managers in 22 firms: When asked what was the major
problem with the African labor force, 45 percent of the managers
interviewed by Pfeffermann answered "qualifications."
An important point to note is that whereas most employers
complain about the lack of skills  in the labor force, relatively few
provide training. We found that only one-third of the workers in
the 17 fims  we surveyed had received  some training in the firm.
Comparing this figure with Pfeffermann's  finding that 42 percent
of  the  firms  in  1963  had  manpower  training  schemes
(Pfeffermann, 1968,  p. 285),  it appears that the amount of training
provided by  most firms has been declining.  It  is  of course
impossible  to draw a firm conclusion  in this respect because of the
potential differences in the two samples.
In assessing the perceived lack of skills in the labor force, one
of course has to take into account the extent and quality of the
educational system.  Available data indicate that the education
budget has increased from less than 1 percent of GDP in 1960  to
5 percent of GDP in 1984. While this increase is impressive,  the
net enrollment rate in primary education is still only 40 percent
and is expected to decline in view of the containment of public
expenditures and the 2.9 percent annual population growth rate.
This,  and  the fact that  only 40 percent  of students  entering
primary schools  graduate, suggests  that the government's objective
to achieve  universal  primary education  by the end of the twentieth
century may be too ambitious. In addition to suffering from low
enrollments, Senegal's  system of primary education is reported to
be exceedingly  academically  oriented, at the expense of practical
training which might facilitate access  to productive employment.
Our interviews with workers revealed many cases of illiteracy,
thus also providing evidence that the educational background of
many workers is very limited.
As mentioned previously,  it appears that many workers were
originally recruited not through the Labor Service but through
other channels. The managers simply  'regularized'  the workers48
with the Labor  Service  after they  had  hired them.  Procedures  for
recruiting  vary by skill  level:  The most common  procedure  for
hiring unskilled  workers (ouvriers-maneuvre)  appears to be to
recruit them at  the gate as  daily workers and offer them
permanent contracts  if they perform  well.  As seen in Table  S5
over two-thirds  of the managers  we  surveyed  indicated  they  follow
this practice.  In observing  the number  of men  waiting  at the gates,
we could  see that the supply  of daily  workers  is unlimited  in the
relevant range. Workers  are sometimre  hired in this manner
because they are recommended  by someone  who works  in the
firm.
TABL  5S2
Smpl  Methods of Reruiting
Emloyees at Varius  Sill  Lvls
Method of  Unskilled  Skilled  Technical
Recruiting  Workers  Workers  Personnel  Managers
Hire  Fust  as Daily Workers  69 %  - -
Ask-  Workers for
Recommendadon  1S %  1S  %  8 %
Promotion  Within the Frm  - 23 %  1S %
Advertise in  Newspaper  15 %  24 %  8 %
Hire Directlyfrom School  - 8 %  8 %
Hire from Other Firms in
Senegal  - - 8 %  1S  %
Europe  - --  1s5%
Note:  These figures  represent  percentages  of the total sample of managers  (17)
that gave these answes Answers  were not provided  by some managers  for
some  ki  groups.
Source: Authors' suvey of managers,  1986.
Skilled  workers  and white  coUlar  e.nployees  are generally  hired
through  newspaper  advertising  or directly  from schools  or other
firms. Internal  promotion  also  plays  an important  role. Although
most firms  tend  to hire  their technical  personnel  from  other  firms,49
some  technicians  are  acquired  through  internal  promotion.
Finally, managers are primarily  sought from other firms, both in
Senegal and in Europe.
A recent study of the employment practices in Senegal's state
owned firms was performed by Lachaud (1987). In his detailed
investigation, Lachaud finds that the access to public sector jobs
varies across occupations: education appears to be the important
prerequisite for higher level positions, while personal contacts
appear to be the principal avenue for obtaining less skilled  jobs.
53  Workers' Views  of Unions
The vast majority of Senegal's  industrial  workers are unionized.
Within our sample, 83 percent of all workers belong to a union;
in 1963,  within Pfeffermann's sample, the figure  was 72.8 percent
(See  Pfeffermann [1968] Table  39, p.  301).  However, these
numbers do not accurately reflect the strength and effectiveness
of the unions as seen from the workers' perspective.  When asked
"What are  the  main  advantages of  union  membership?" the
responses of workers were unenthusiastic and sometimes very
criticaL Judging from their expressions,  most workers feel that
the  unions are  not doing very much.  Even so, workers were
unlikely to criticize  the unions when given the opportunity; in our
questionnaire most of them gave the answers  they felt "should  be
given."  In trying to discover the reason for this conformity, it
appears to us that few workers criticized the unions because the
unions  are  closely  aligned  with  the  government  and  our
questionnaire, although guaranteeing respondent anonymity,  was
officially  approved by the government census office.
The worker responses which we obtained are consistent with
those from the 1963 survey by Pfeffermann (1968, pp. 301-304)
in which simflar questions were asked. To the question "What  are
unions there for?" 71.3  percent of the workers in 1963  identified
"protection against bosses and defense of interests," which is
strikingly  similar to the 69.7  percent of our sample that identified
some form of union protection (see Table 5.3).  When asked
about their general opinion of unions, 48.5  percent of the workers
interviewed in 1963 had no opinion and 31.7 percent criticized
unions. (About 20 percent did not answer this qucstion because
they were  not  union  members.) When  asked "Who initiates
strikes?"  52.3  percent of the workers  interviewed  in 1963  answered50
'union  officialse  and 9 percent answered 'the workers."  When
asked to  identify the  main criticism of their own union, 59.5
percent  of  these workers answered 'gap  between leaders and
workers," 21 percent  said "corruption,"  and  6.3 percent noted
"excessive  political involvement."
TABLE 53
SLengk Advanta= of Unio  Manbaehip
Perceint  of Total Who
Volunteered  This Answer.
Protection of:
Wages  41.7  %
Working  Conditions  21.0 %
Other  7.0 %
No advant_ges  17.7  %
No opinion  10.0  %
No answer  3.6 %
Source: Authors' survey  of workers,  1986.
Combining  the information from the 1963  and 1986  surveys  of
the workers' opinions, we obtain the impression  that trade unions
in Senegal are, and have been, generally aligned with powerful
political  groups  and  somewhat divorced from  the  workers'
mterests. This view of the "cooperating"  unions is also held by the
the noncooperating (opposition) trade union organizations.  The
question that naturally arises in this context is why the majority
of workers join the unions. The answer seems to lie in low union
dues and a sense of protection against  potentially extreme actions
by employers.
5.4  Trade Union Perspective
On the several occasions that we met with the leaders of the
CNTS, we were  struck  by their  low-budget operation,  tbhir
adversarial  rather  than  cooperative  approach  to  industrial
relations, and the fact that although some of their positions were51
based on very accurate information, others were founded on a
total lack of information and accuracy.
The CNTS operates in an alliance with the government and in
severe mistrust of the employers.  It attributes Senegal's  economic
problems to the lack of investment,  to poor labor policies, and
to  limited worker training within most firms. CNTS sees  its
activities as essential for the protection of workers' welfare and
as  not  harmful  to  the  efficient  operation  of  enterprises.
Interestingly,  trade union mistrust of employers does not appear
to be abating with the Senegalization  of management (see Table
4.9), but rather appears to be b' sed on class lines.
55  The Noncooperative  Outcome
The most important feature of the highly  adversarial  system of
industrial relations is the economic  and social outcome, which is
suboptimal from the standpoint of all the concerned parties. The
trade  unions' severe mistrust of management results in  union
pressure on the workers to resist exploitation by the employer.
This translates into low worker motivation and a  decrease in
overall labor productivity. Moreover,  because  job security and the
base  wage are  virtually guaranteed by labor regulations and
because the  total wage is not directly linked to  performance,
lessened effort and  low productivity are to be expected.  Job
security regulations prevent employers from paying efficiency
wages and induce them to substitute daily (temporary) workers
for the permanent ones as often as possible. Tne government has
attempted  to  limit  these  practices by restricting the  use  of
temporary workers and by permitting layoffs only in extreme
cases. This, in turn, has discouraged employers from hiring new
permanent  workers  and  has  possibly increased  turnover  of
temporary (unskilled)  workers (see, e.g.,  the 1985  figures in Table
45).  The outcome appears to be a low productivity,  low wage,
noncooperative  solution.  As  we  show  in  Chapter  6,  this
institutionally  based hypothesis  is consistent  with the econometric
findings of falling total factor productivity.6
Te  Producfivity  Effects of
Labor  Force Structure,
Enterprise Ownership,
and Foreign Trade Variables
In this chapter we analyze quantitatively the determinants of
productivity  in the 80 sampled firms. The data set is in the form
of an annual panel covering  80 firms during the 1980-1985  period.
Our focus is on the evolution of total factor productivity over
time and the productivity  effects  of the following  variables: (1) the
composition of the enterprises' labor force (in  terms of skill,
nationality and permanent versus temporary employment); (2)
enterprise  ownership, as  determined  by  the  percentage  of
enterprise shares owned by Senegalese citizens, the Senegalese
state, or foreign individuals  and companies (in 1984  or 1985); (3)
the effective rate of protection and enterprise export orientation.
As we pointed out in Chapter 5, employers  often complain  that
the low productivity of Senegal's workers is one  of the  main
reasons for  the  poor performance of the country's  industrial
sector.  Employers  also  argue  that  the  enormous  wage
differentisals  betveen Senegalese and non-African  employees are
(more than) justified by their different productivities.  In contrast,
the  trade  unions argue that  such differentials are  frequently
unwarranted and constitute a siphoning-off  of profits that ought
to  be  reinvested or  used for the remuneration of  Senegalese
workcers.
These arguments have been aired for decades, but the issue
has remained unsettled. To provide a more solid background for
examining  this question,  we have  collected  detailed firm-level  data
on production, labor cost, and employment variables, and on a
variety of enterprise and worker characteristics.  With these data,
we estimate augmented production  functions  and assess the extent
of overutilization of different types of labor as well as the effect
of the aforementioned structural and policy variables on output.54
Our  general  approach  is  to  estimate  industry-specific and
overall (sample-wide) production functions  of the form
InQ = g(Z)f(X),
where Q is value added in constant domestic or world prices, X
is a vector of inputs, and Z is a vector of structural and policy
variables that may  affect productive  efficiency  and lend themselves
to or become potential tools in a policy  reform. The function f(X)
is hence the input function, and g(Z) is the productive efficiency
function.
The X variables that we use include the gross capital stock, the
number of permanent workers in the various national and skill
groups, 1 and the defiated wage bill of temporary workers. The
latter variable is used as a measure of the temporary labor input.
Apart  from  the  time  trend, which captures the  evolution of
productive efficiency  over time, the Z variables include  enterprise
ownership measured  by the percentage  of  enterprise  capital
owned by (a) Senegalese state--referred to in the tables as  %
Senegalese State," (b) French citizens or companies-referred to
as  %  French," (c)  Syro-Lebanese nationals or  companies-
referred to as "% Syro-Lebanese,"  and (d) individuals,  companies
or  governments of  other  countries-referred  to  as  "%  Other
Foreirn."  The Z vector also includes the percentage of output
that  is  exported  (capturing  efficiency differentials  between
exporting and  nonexporting firms), and  the effective rate  of
pr  otection (reflectmg2productivity  differences  between more and
esprotected firms).'
The latter three variables (ownership,  export orientation, and
effective protection) are of particular relevance to public policy.
Although econometric evidence  is scarce,3  institutional knowledge
has led numerous governments and international organizations,
1. In the few  instances  when no workers  of a given  nationaiy were found in
a given  group (cell),  we set the value  of the natural logarithm  of this labor input
variable equal to 0.001. The results  are not sensitive  to variations  in this number.
2. The effective  rate of protection  is defined as the percentage differential
between a fin's  value-added  calculated  with  domestic  and world prices.
3. See for example Aharoni (1986)  and Svejnar and Hariga (1987) for a
dision  of the misting  studies.55
such as the World Bank, to pursue policies that  favor private
ownership,  export orientation, and decreased trade protection. At
the enterprise level, these policies are motivated by the belief that
private, export-oriented and less protected firms tend to be more
efficient than others.  Within Senegal,  there is also a widespread
belief that foreign-owned firms tend to be more efficient than
domestic-owned  ones. Our data and analytical  design enabled US
to test these hypotheses.
In estimating the production functions,  we have tried several
specifications:  an augmented Cobb-Douglas  form, an augmented
Cobb-Douglas  form with linearly  additive  components within  each
skill group, and more flexible forms such as the translog. The
Cobb-Douglas function  has  numerous  desirable  properties,
including parsimony and ease of interpretation, but its principal
drawback  is its assumption that all inputs can be substituted with
a unitary elasticity. This may not be totally realistic but, because
at  the  most  disaggregated level we are  dealing with  thirteen
different labor inputs,  the use of more flexible  functional forms
(e.g., translog) proved too cumbersome.
In our view,  the main problem with the Cobb-Douglas  function
is  that  it  may underestimate  the  ease with which firms can
substitute different nationals with the same skills (e.g,  skilled
Senegalese and skilled other-African workers) in production. It
could be argued that these workers have different productivities
but are very easily substituted for one another. To allow for this
possibility,  we have estimated the Cobb-Douglas  function  with the
labor input of different national groups entered  in  a  linearly
additive form within each skill group. This amounts to assuming
that the elasticity of substitution of aUl  workers within the same
skill group  is infinite and  reflects better  the  hypothesis that
substitution of different  nationals within skill groups is  easy.
Moreover, it permits a direct comparison of worker productivity
across national groups. Unfortunately, the estiniated parameters
of relative productivities converged to implausibly large values
and, when constrained to remain within reasonably  wide bounds
(e.g., a 20/1 maximum  relative productivity  differential betwee-n
non-Africans and Senegalese within a given skill group), they
invariably converged to  the  boundary. As  a  result, we have
4.  These  include four skill  categories  for  each of the three national  groups  and
the temporary  workers.56
invariably converged to  the  boundary. As  a  result, we  have
adopted the standard, augmented Cobb-Douglas  function as our
principal specification.
Tables 6.1-6.13  contain our estimates of various specifications
of the Cobb-Douglas  value-added  functions.  Tables 6.1-6.3  report
sample-wide estimates with industry-specific  fixed effects, and
Tables 6A-6.13 contain parameter estimates by industry. Each
table gives results based on deflated value-added  in domestic and
world prices. The world price data on value-added are based on
the calculations of  the effective rate  of protection that were
computed for each firm in our sample by a World Bank financed
project carried  out  at the Senegal's Ministry of Finance. The
availability  of value-added  data in both domestic  and world prices
enables us to assess the effects of the numerous variables in the
context  of  both  domestic distortions and  the  more  objective
scarcities of the world market.
6.1 Overall Production Function Estimates
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the instrumental variable (IV) and
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, respectively, of three
major specifications  of the Cobb-Douglas  production function. In
each table, columns 1-3 contain estimates based on value-added
in domestic prices; estimates in columns 4-6 are based on value-
added  in  world prices. Ihe  instruments used  are  canonical
correlation variables derived from firm-specific  dummy  variables
interacted with time and with the value-added deflator (see e.g.,
Bowden  and  Turkington,  1984). The  variables  which  we
instrumented are the labor input variables, capital stock, and the
percentage of output that is exported. The IV and OLS estimates
yield similar results, with the OLS estimates being occasionally
more significant.
As the estimated coefficients in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate,
total factor productivity appears to be unrelated to enterprise
ownership, except for the Syro-Lebanese  firms, which display a
significantly (30-50 percent) inferior level of productivity.  The
results challenge  three traditional notions, namely  that (1) private
firms are more productively  efficient  than public  ones; (2) foreign-
owned firms are more productively  efficient than domestically-
owned  ones;  and  (3)  Syro-Lebanese enterprises  are  more
productively  efficient  than domestically-owned  firms and, possibly,
other  foreign-owned firms.  The  results  hold  for  various57
specifications based on value-added in both domestic and world
prices, and the question naturally arises as to whether systematic
mnisrepresentation  of accounts could give rise to these findings
The  negative  productivity  effect  of  the  Syro-Lebanese
ownership is particularly  intriguing, given the  reputation  for
success on the part of the Syro-Lebanese  entrepreneurs. In this
context it is worth noting that our earnings function estimates in
Chapter  7  indicate  that  Syro-Lebanese firms  tend  to  pay
seemingly comparable workers significantly  (30-70  percent) less
than  do  other  firms.  The  productivity differential is  hence
consistent with a labor cost differential in these firms.
An important aspect that is often overlooked in the discussions
on  relative  performance of  private and  public (government-
owned) firms is the part played by the market structure (extent of
competition). In particular, the relatively  inferior performance of
public firms is frequently observwd  in circumstances  when these
firms are accorded a much greater degree of market power or
access  to  resources  (e.g.,  subsidies)  than  their  private
counterparts.  The few studies that have examined the two types
of firms in competitive environments  often do not find differences
in  performance.;  In  Senegal, the  market  structure is  very
concentrated and many private firms have succeeded in obtaining
concessions (in  the  form of  so called convendom) from  the
government. Some of these private firms (e.g.,  the sugar complex)
are notorious for their inefficiency  but they survive  because of the
special arrangements.  This  institutional and  feature offers a
possible  explanation for  our  findings about  the  impact  of
enterprise ownership on productivity.
The estimated coefficients on the trade variables indicate that
enterprise  export  orientation  (measured  by  exports  as  a
proportion of total sales) is unrelated to total factor productivity,
but that the impact of effective  protection is sizable and negative
when value-added is expressed in world prices. The latter finding
strongly supports the hypothesis that protection has a deleterious
effect on productive efficiency,  and it shows that the effect may
not be  detectable when distorted domestic prices are used to
calculate  value-added.  The insignificance  of the export  orientation
variable suggests that exporting per se need not induce the firm
5. See,  e.g.,  Caves  and Christensen  (1980).TABLE 6.1
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Middle  Managers)
(Continued) Table 62 (Con't)
Based  on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in  Domestic  Prices  in  World Prices
1  2  3  4  S  6
In (Other Afrims  3.BE4  42134!  3.lE4  0308BE-
Tednidans  and  (1.11-4)  (1.OE-4)  (1.E4)  (0.106E-3)
Middle  Managers)
In (Non-Africans  93E-5  4.7E-5
Tecduiaans  and  (6.8E-5)  (72E-5)
Middle  Managas)
In (Senegalese  Upper  72E-S  S.11E5
Managers)  (7.0E-S)  (7.41-5)
In (Other Africans  23134  1.4E4
Upper Managers)  (I.SE,4)  (1.6E-4)
In (Non-Africans  -3.11-5  -7.01-5
Upper Managers)  (86E-5)  (92E-S)
In (Cotal Senegalese)  0510  0580
(O.OS7)  (0.060)
bn  (Total  Other Africans)  1.6E4'  4&S4
(S.9E-S)  (62&)hi (Total Non-Africans)  2.93-5  438-5
(1.11-4)  (1.1-4)
In (Wage  Bill  12E4'  124'  12E4  12-4'  92-S  1.11.4
Temporary  Workers)  (7.01-5)  (6.7B5)  (6.9BS)  (758-5)  (7.11-5)  (72  )
In  K  0.494'  0511*  0.467*  0574*  0571*  0SOS
(0.043)  (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.04S)  (0.019)
TIme  .054  0.062!  .057  .0.0  7.  4075  -0.007
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)
Industry
Intercepus  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R2 088S  0.883  0.880  0.884  0.8  0.8B1
N  386  386  386  375  375  375
- - Sinificant at the S percent statistical  test leveL
+ - Significant  at the 10  percet  statistical  test leveL
Source: 80 firm sample66
to  adopt  more efficient methods of production, although this
conclusion must be qualified by the fact that many Senegal-based
firras export to other West African countries rather than to the
more competitive markets in economically  developed countries.
The labor input coefficients reported in columns 1 and 4 of
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that output elasticities  of non-Africans
in all skill categories art  not significantly  greater than zero. 6 Put
differently, one  cannot reject the hypothesis that the marginal
product of non-African  labor in any given skill  group is zero. This
result indicates that non-Africans  could  be removed on the margin
without affecting the level of output, ceteris  paribus. Given the
high  salaries  commanded by  expatriates, this  zero  marginal
productivity  estimate suggests  that from the standpoint of national
economic welfare, the rapid Senegalization  that we discussed in
Chapter 4 could have proceeded at an even faster rate.
This conclusion has to be qualified by the fact that estimates
of zero marginal product are obtained for upper managers in
each one of the three nationality groups. The fully  unconstrained
model does not  permit  one to  detect. significant variations in
productivity  when the level of upper rmanagement  input is varied
in any national group.
To explore this issue further, we htave  estimated several more
constrained versions of the basic model.  Regressions reported
in columns  3 and 6 of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 aggregate  the labor input
across  skill categories and  generate  estimates of the  output
elasticities of the total labor input of each of the three national
groups. The results based on this more parsimonious  specification
point  to  a  significantly positive  marginal product  for  the
Senegalese employees as a group and an insigniricantly  negative
marginal product for the non-Africans taken a:; a group.  The
estimate for other Africans, taken as a group, is positive and
significant  or insignificant,  depending on specification.  This more
constrained specification hence also suggests that a  somewhat
faster  exodus  of  non-African employees, although  reducing
considerably the enterprise wage bill, would have no significant
effect on output.
6.  The significant  coefficient  ir. the unskilled  non-African  worker category  is
irrelevant from the public  policy  standpoint  because  the number  of these workers
declined  from 29 in 1980  to 14 in 1984  and to 1 in 1985.67
As a further check, the IV and OLS regressions reported in
Table  63  constrain the  labor input coefficients of  the  three
national groups to be identical,  but allow  for different coefficients
by skill group. The results suggest that the marginal product of
upper level managers, taken as a group, is significantly  positive.
TABL  63
Sena  (ABl  IaLxtles):  OLS and  IV Estim  of Augmnted CobbWDougs
Prduton  Funtion  Based  on Skill Groups
Dpedmt  Variabble  - Log of Conslant  Pice Value Added
(Values in parcnthcscs  are standard errors)
Based  on  Based on
Value-Added  Value-Added
in Domestic Prices  in World  Prices
Qm  IV  Q  A  I
Intercept  -0.493  -0.780  -1.199'  .1.425
% Senegalesc  Pate  (0.489)  (0522)  (0.530)  (0.564)
% Senegalese  State  -0.074  -5.6E.4  -0.048  7.8E  3
(0248)  (0.268)  (0.258)  (0.277)
neEunhi-
% French  0.176k  0.179  0.035  0.036
(0.097)  (0.100)  (0.102)  (0.105)
% Syro-Lebanese  O.418e  0.370  -0516  40.471*
(0.114)  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.121)
% Other Foreign  0.109  0.116  40.061  -0.054
(0.118)  (0.121)  (0.123)  (0.124)
Trmde  Variables:
Effective  Rate of  8.0E-4  2.0E-3  -0325  40329'
Protection  (0.007)  (7AE-3)  (0.021)  (0.022)
% Exports  0.026  -0.043  -0.043  4-.122
(0.159)  (0.189)  (0.167)  (0.196)
(Continued)68
Table 63 (Cont.)
Based on  Based on
Value-Added  Value-Added
In Domestic  Prices  in World Prices
In (Unsklled Workers)  039S  0368  0.43?  0.421
(0.052)  (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.060)
In (Skilled  Workers)  1.41-4  2.9E-4  1.7E-4  3.5E-4*
(13E-4)  (1.8E-4)  (1.4E4)  (1.8E-4)
In (Middle  Management)  13E54  2.05.4  S.8E-5  9.3E.5
(7.8E-5)  (9.9E-5)  (8.1E-5)  (1.0E-4)
In (Upper Management)  2.8E4'  65E4!  155-4  3.7E4'
(135-4)  (1.85-4)  (13E-4)  (1.8S-4)
In (Wage Bill  7.7E5-  8.0O-5  6.7J.5  825-S
Tempora  Workers)  (6.95-5)  (825)  (73E.5)  (8.655)
In K  0.565  0.593^  0.611*  0.631^
(0.043)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.050)
nime  .0.067'  .0.070  -0.079  -0.081'
(0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)
Industry 1itefcept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
0.873  0.869  0.874  0.872
N  386  387  375  387
*  - Significant at the S percent  statistical  test  leveL
+  - Significant  at the 10 percent statistical  test level.
Source:  80-finn  sample
These results are consistent  with the interpretation  that upper
level managerial input is  important, but that  the  observed
substantial  decline  in the non-African  managerial  input has not
had a significant  impact  on output.
Returning to  Tables 6.1 and 6.2, we observe that in  most
specifications  the wage  bill of temporary  workers  has a significant
positive  coefficient.  If we  assume  that temporary  workers  are paid
a competitive  wage,  the variation  in the wage  bill  approximates69
the variation in the effective use of this input. The estimates
sugest  that  the  marginal product of  the  temporary labor is
postive and  that this easily adjustable  input is not used to the
point where its marginal product is zero. However, as we will
show, the significance  of this estimated coefficient drops in the
industry-specific  regressions with fewer degrees of freedom.
The estimated coefficient on the  time trend is negative and
significant, suggesting  that, ceci  paribus, firms have tended to
experience a 5-7  percent decline in total factor productivity  per
year in the 1980s.  While this finding is consistent with the view
that  the  highly regulated labor market  and  a  noncooperative
system of industrial relations are having a negative productivity
impact,  many  other  factors  undoubtedly contribute  to  this
potentiaUly  serious problem.
62 IndustrySpecific Poduction  Function  Estdmates
Tables 6A-6.13  report the IV and OLS estimates for the food
industry, chemical and extraction industry, mechanical industry,
textile, clothing  and  leather  industry,  and  paper  and  wood
industry.  The principal advantage of these industry estimates is
that they allow for inter-industry differences in technology and
in the impact of various structural and policy factors.  As such,
they more accurately reflect the factors that determine value-
added in each industry. The main drawback of estimating the
regressions by industry is that the number of observations per
industry  and  the  statistical  significance of  the  estimated
coefficients  are naturally smaller in industry-specific  runs than in
the regressions based on the entire sample.
Because the number of firms in each industry is considerably
less than the total number of firms in the overall (all industry)
sample, we did not rely on the canonical correlation procedure
to  create  instrumental  variables  for  the  industry-specific
regressions; rather, the instruments used in these IV regressions
were firm dummy variables interacted with tirne and with the
value-added deflator. The predictive power of these instruments
was quite high and, as can be seen from Tables 6.4-6.13,  the OLS
estimates are  only marginally more significant than their  IV
counterparts.
With several exceptions, the industry estimates parallel the
overall (sample-wide)  findings  discussed  in section 6.1. The closest70
correspondence arises with respect to the trade variables: The
effective  rate  of  protection  invariably displays  a  negative
significant effect on total factor productivity in terms of world
P  rices, but enterprise export orientation is only rarely found to
ave  a positive association with real value-added.
Enterprise ownership  registers a somewhat  more diverse  impact
across industries. Senegalese state a-id, to a lesser extent, other
(than French and Syro-Lebanese)  foreign ownership  are found to
be  conducive to  higher total  factor productivity in  the  food
industry; French  and  other  foreign ownership have a  similar
impact in the chemical ad-extraction  industries.  Finally, there is
Emited  evidence  that  other  foreign  firms  tend  to  be  less
productive than others in the mechanical industry. In the textile,
clothing and leather as well as wood and paper industries, the
impact of ownership could not be precisely estimated because of
colinearity  problems. The serious nature of these problems is
demonstrated for  the  textile, clothing and leather industry in
columns 1 and 2 as well as 4 and 5 of Tables 6.10 and 6.11. In the
case of wood and paper, we therefore present only specifications
without the ownership variables.
The coefficients on unskilled  or unskilled plus skilled  labor are
positive and significant in most regressions, but the coefficient
estimates for more skilled employees, although usually  positive,
are invariably  insignificant.  As mentioned earlier, the estimated
coeicients  for the wage bill of temporary workers are mostly
positive but they are usually insignificant.
The negative time trend effect is found in most regressions in
the food and mechanical  industries. However, the negative effect
is less significant  in the textile, clothing and leather industry and
it is insignificant  in the chemical and extraction industries.  There
is hence some evidence that the decline in total factor productivity
may not be universal.TABLE  6.4
Sml  (Food Jnduay):  IV E_mits  of Augmnted Cobb-DougsS  Pro&I'on
unions  - Depndent  Vuiable - LAg of Cota  Price  alue d
(Values in parthee  are sadard  erors)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  0.367  -0.743  0.031  2.442  1.527  1.229
(% Senegalese  Private)  (1.049)  (0.954)  (0912)  (1.756)  (1.791)  (1.510)
Ownership:
% Senegalese  State  1.165'  1.055  0.844  1252  1.759'  1.006'
(0.682)  (0.682)  (0-593)  (0.617)  (0-530)  (0.530)
% French  0.261  .0246  -0.102  0.034  -0312  -0267
(0330)  (0.256)  (0.233)  (0388)  (03m0)  (0279)
% Syro-Lebanese  0.068  -0.152  -0202  0.136  0.160  0.019
(0394)  (0.227)  (0211)  (0.456)  (0.275)  (0253)
% Other Foreign  0.661'  0.402  0383  0.470  0524  0289
(0390)  (0275)  (0254)  (0.461)  (0379)  (0336)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.09?  0.148!  0.115  -0353*  0248e  .0298
Protection  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.054)
(Ctie  <Table 64 (Con't.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
% Exports  -0320  -0.672e  -0.427  -0.425  *0.s*  .08o
Exponts  (0.267)  (0282)  (0.267)  (0.312)  (0339)  (0326) .pts:
In (Senegalese  Skilled  0.651  0.673
and Unsk$lled)  (0.115)  (0.136)
In (Other African  1.1E-4  2.6E-4
Slcled h  Unskilled)  (1.SA4)  (18E-4)
In (Non-African  Skied  4.0E4'  2.9E-4 
and Unsilled)  (1.4E-4)  (1.7E-4)
In (Senegle  se Middle  19E-4  2A6i4
and Upper Management)  (1.9B-4)  (2.4E-4)
tn  (Otier African  Midle  2.3E-4  62E4'
and Upper Management)  (1.9B4)  (2.3A4)
In (NonAfrican Middle  -S 1E4'  -S.SE-4
and Upper Managemnt)  (3.12,4)  (3A6E-4)
In (Unskilled  Workes)  0on  008
(0.12)  -l  7*(0.146)  OA
0  (0.116)  (0.141)
In (Skiled Workers)  0.001  -9.IPA
(4.7BE4)  (5.7E-4)In (Middle Management)  -3.01-4  9.E-6
(2.4E.4)  (2.9B-4)
In (Upper Management)  4.1E-4  3.4E-4
(3.6E-4)  (4.6E-4)
in (Wage Bill  of  38E-5  1.9E4  Z4E-4  3.1E-4  4.8E4  4.7Ee4
Temporaty  Workers)  (1.8B-4)  (1.6E4)  (1.SE-4)  (2.4E-4)  (22E4)  (2.OE.4)
InK  0.351*  0.367'  0.369  0228  0201  0.274!
(0.097)  (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.142)  (0.155)  (0.137)
rime  -0.012*  -0.056*  40.089*  -0.0704  4.044  4.088*
(0.030)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.039)
R2  0.895  0.879  083  0.35  0802  0.801
N  116  116  116  110  110  110
*  - Significant  at the 5 % statilrical test leel.
+ e  Significant  at the IC % statistical  test level.
The food indwt,y includes  22 !irms from the following  subindustries sugar, oil, fish,  flour, and othr  foodsTABLE  65
Sea  (Fod  Inisl):  OIS Esiat  of Amgmed  Cobb-l)iPodu.aIor
Fuaniions  -Deaidn  aible  - Log of Constant  Price ValueAdo
(Vabues  in pamtheses are sndard  errors)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  0.394  -0.623  0.033  2.665+  1.626  1.312
(% Senegalese  Private)  (0.845)  (0.711)  (0.742)  (1.546)  (1.531)  (1.381)
Ownership:
% Senegalese  State  1.255'  1.164'  0859  1.473*  1.710  1.082!
(0.455)  (0386)  (0368)  (0.581)  (0.569)  (0.513)
% French  0276  .0.124  40.069  0.079  -0232  -0.227
(0319)  (0237)  (0228)  (0374)  (0287)  (0.275)
% Syro-Lebanese  0.107  4.189  .0.199  0.248  0.122  0.034
(0374)  (0209)  (0.207)  (0.436)  (0.264)  (0253)
% Other Foreign  0.703*  0.466  OA12+  0.601  0.581+  0.351
(0364)  (0.233)  (0.231)  (0.439)  (0.348)  (0326)
Trade Variables:
Effetive Rate of  0.098!  0.118  0.109  40322  -O263'  4295
Protection  (0.044)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.054)% Exports  .0342  .0391+  -0383  -4A51+  -0.446  40.435
Inu-ts:  (0=7)  (0231)  (0.229)  (0266)  (0284)  (0282)
In (Senegalese  Skilled  0.632  0.663*
and Unskilled)  (0.098)  (0.115)
In (Other African  0.11B-3  027E-3+
Skilled  and Unskilled)  (0.13E-3)  (0.16E-3)
In (Non-African  Skflled  0282-3  0.20E-3
and Unskilled)  (0.11E-3)  (0.13E-3)
In (Senegalese  Middle and  0.20B-3  0.32E-3
Upper Management)  (0.182-3)  (023E-3)
In (Other African  Middle  0.16B-3  0.43E-3
and Upper Management)  (0.16E-3)  (0.19E-3)
In (Non-African  Middle  -0.49E-3+  -0.59E-3+
and Upper Management)  (0.29E-3)  (0.35E-3)
In (Unskilled  Workers)  0.638!  0.651
(0097)  0.632e  (0.119)  a  h
In (Skiled Workers)  -0392-3  (0.101)  3  (0.122)
(0.33E-3)  (OAE11-3)
(Continued)Table 6.5 (Cont.) 
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic Prices  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
In (Middle  Management)  -022E-3  0.30B-4
(0.21E-3)  (026E-3)
In (Upper Management)  0.13E-3  0.541-4
(0.31E-3)  (0.39E-3)
In (Wage  BM  of  0.14E-3  0.20B-3  024E-3*  0.39E-3'  0.46E3  0.45AE4
Temporaiy  Workers)  (0.15E-3)  (0.14E-3)  (0.14E-3)  (0.19E-3)  (0.19E-3)  (0.18B-3)
InK  0.349  OA29'  0.377*  0.194  0.251  0.274
(0.078)  (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.126)  (0.135)  (0.125)
Tume  4.076*  .0081  4.090*  4.070e  4.068  4.089W
(0.029)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.041)  (0.08)
R2  0.897  0888  0883  0.838  0808  0.801
N  115  115  115  109  109  109
*  - Significant  at the 5 % statistical  test leveL
+  - Significant  at the 10 % statistical  test leveL
The food industry  includes  24 firms from the following  sub-industies  wsugar,  o,  fish,  flour, and other food.TABLE 66
sene  (Chukm  & i  _  ation  Imhst#w)
IV  9mate  of Auguimted  Cobb-Dougla Prodtion
Fuons  -D-endent  Varable - Log of Co(ant  Price  Value  Added
(Values  in paentheses ar  sadard  earrs)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Pnce  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  -2.117  -3.253*  -1.951  -3.6514  -3.799'  _2644
(% Senegalese  Private)  (2.735)  (1.422)  (1567)  (2.083)  (1.379)  (1.465)
Ownershira:
% Senegalese  State  -0.703  -0564  -1.039  -2.353  -1.079  -0.813
(2.239)  (1.369)  (1.280)  (1.657)  (1.067)  (0.947)
% French  1356'  0.992  0.951'  0.134  01i39  0.427
(0568)  (0370)  (0371)  (0.403)  (0296)  (OM)
% Syro-Lebanese  0.625  0.461  0.266  0384  0.426  0243
(0493)  (0367)  (0347)  (0384)  (0.345)  (0.291)
% Other Foreig  2259  1.402  1319  0.929  0.816'  0633'
(0.702)  (OA52)  (0.438)  (0.649)  (0.422)  (0354)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.052'  0.032e  0.021  0328'  0.341'  403S8'
Protection  (0.029)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.065)  (0.054)  (0.049)Table  6.6 (Con't)
Based on Value-Added  Based on ValueAdded
in Domestic Price  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
% Exports  1.978  1.541+  1964  1.613*  1.179'  1.076
(1350)  (0.933)  (0.853)  (0.792)  (0.603)  (0.600)
Inputs:
In (Senegalese Skilled  -0.050  0388
and Unskilled)  (0285)  (0.262)
ln (Other African  -12E-4  .6.2E4
Silled  and Unskilled)  (3.OE-4)  (23E-4)
In (Non-African Skled  1.2E-4  9.9E-5
and Unskilled)  (3.OE14)  (2.3E-4)
In (Senegalese Middle  0.001  32E-4
and Upper  Management)  (5.4E-4)  (5.9-4)
In (Other  African Middle  2AE4  2.3E-4
and Upper  Management)  (32A4)  (22-4)
In (Non-African Middle  35B-4  -5.4E-5
and Upper  Management)  (6.OE-4)  (5.1E-4)In (Unskilled  Workers)  -0.037  0.111
(0.160)  0244  (0.159)  02S1
)  (0.174)  j}  (0.160)
In (Skilled  Workers)  6.BE-4  -6.9E-4
(1.E3)  (1 2Y-3)
In (Middle Managenent)  42B-4  45
(3.1E-4)  (32A4)
In (Upper Management)  .E4  2.3E-4
(4.7E4)  ~~~~~~~~(4.6E-4;)
In (Wage  BiD  of  -53EB4  -2.4E4  -12E-4  53E-4  2.7E4  2.7134
Temporary  Workers)  (4.7E-4)  (3.OEB4)  (3.0E-4)  (3.SE4)  (2.6E4)  (2.3E-4)
InK  0.655*  0.748*  0545*  0.706*  0.787*  0.659
(0250)  (0.145)  (0.161)  (0.202)  (0.136)  (0.150)
rime  -0.023  -0.031  -0.004  -0.054  .0.036  -0.025
(0.055)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.  03)
OBOS  0.867  0.857  0.891  0885  089
92  92  92  87  87  87
Signifcznt at the 5 % statistical  test level
- Sinifcant  at the 10 % stadstical  test level.
Our sample in these industries  consists  of 18 finnsTABLE 67
00
_Me (chemukul  and Butmco  sie0
OIS Eimate  of Aupeftod  Cobb-Doue  =ProidLion
F  ba - D  t  Vaisble  - IAB of Cont  Price Va2ue  Added
(Vaues In par  _theues  arwe  aadard  ers)
Basd  on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intecept  2.506'  .3281'  -2.071+  -3.871  3.749  -2.939
% Senegalese  Private)  (1.057)  (1.162)  (1.609)  (124)  (1306)  (1349)
Ownershin:
% Senegalese  State  1.514  1.086  1.138  -0.485  0.027  0.158
(O"829)  (0.738)  (0.718)  (0.957)  (0836)  (0.805)
% French  0.77h  0.793*  0.6906  0.411  0.656  0549
(0.239)  (0.221)  (0217)  (0286)  (0248)  (0.242)
% Syro-Lebanese  0.232  0.295  0.050  0397  0.403  0309
(0268)  (0266)  (0.244)  (0305)  (0.295)  (0.271)
% Other Foreign  1.498  1.133'  0.939  0.973*  0.716  0.644+
(0359)  (0306)  (0.289)  (0.485)  (0367)  (0.333)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.013  0.013  0.001  -0.344'  -0331  ^0343
Protecion  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.047)%  ljpos  0.257  0.405  OA52  0.649  0.567  0.545
(0387)  (0389)  (0372)  (0.447)  (0.439)  (0.415)
In lSenegalese  Sklled  0.109  0.205
and Unffiilled)  (0.143)  (0.170)
In (Other Afidcan  -0.11B-3  -0.34E-3
Skilled  and Unskilled)  (0.15E-3)  (0.17E-3)
In (Non-African  -0.01B-3  -033E-4
Skilied  and Unskilled)  (0.152-3)  (0.19E-3)
In (Senegalem  Middle and  0882-3  0.42E-3
Upper Management)  (0.29E-3)  (0.403)
In (Other African  Middle  0.14E-3  022E-3
and Upper  Management)  (0.14E3)  (0.15E-3)
In (Non-African  bMiddle  029E-3  027E-3
and Upper  Management)  (D252-3)  (0282-3)
In (Unskilled  Workers)  0.029  0088
(0.113)  1  0.291*  (0127)  0210
(0.125)  (0.141)
In (Sied  Worers)  0.17E-3  (  ).17E04
(051B-3)  (0372-3)
In (Middle  Management)  037E-3+  -O855
(0.202-3)  (0.24E-3)  (Continued)
00
(Continued)  I-Table 6.7  (Conet.)
Based on Value-Add  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
In (upper Management)  -01E-4  0.12E-3
(0-35E-3)  (038B-3)
In (Wage  BiU  of  -0.11E-3  -0.94W-4  -0.34EW4  0.E-4  -0.16E4  0.89E-5
Temporary  Workers)  (0.15E-3)  (0.14E-3)  (0.14E-3)  (0.17E-3  (0.17E-3)  (0.16E-3)
InK  0.661*  0.748  0.53*  0.77*  0.789*  0.688e
(0.126)  (0.101)  (0.118)  (0.151)  (0.115)  (0.132)
rime  -0.016  -0.031  -0.59E-3  -0.949  40.037  -0.029
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.034)
R2  0.915  0.900  0.900  0.907  0.892  0.894
N  91  91  91  86  86  86
:.Signriicant at the S % statistical  test level.
* Significant  at the 10  % statistical  test level.
Our sample  in these industries  consists  of 18 rtmsTABLE 6(8
IV Ett  Product  Do  u_  Prodion
Punctions  - Dfqeden  Variae  - Log of Constant Pre  Vahle  Added
(Values in parenthe_  are standard enon)
Bated on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  2.732  .0.065  .0.845  1863  0.050  -1.660
(% Senegalese  Private)  (1.857)  (1.094)  (0.699)  (2.034)  (1.251)  (0.797)
%l  Scneplesc State  1.406  .0.059  *0.520  2.077  1.049  0.648
(1.483)  (1.301)  (1.024)  (1.625)  (1.487)  (1.168)
% French  0216  0.207  0285  -0.494  .0.443  -0230
(0388)  (0.503)  (0.270)  (0.425)  (0.575)  (0308)
% Syro-Lebanese  1.466  1.213  -0.429  1.985  2.004  0.016
(0.913)  (1332)  (0.510)  (1.000)  (1522)  (0.581)
% Other Foreign  -0.441  -0533  0.S740  -1.151w  -1.137*  -1248
(0.348)  (0.480)  (0.292)  (0382)  (0.549)  (0333)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.037  0.017  0.027  -0239*  -0281  .02S8
Protection  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.040)  (0.037)  20.031)Table 6.8  (Coaet.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added in Domestic  Prices  in World Priccs
1  2  3  4  5  6
% F.1r,-AU  .04.025  1.252,  0.370  .0.110  1.62e  0.208
%El!'  >(O.853)  (0.746)  (0.621)  (0.934)  (0.253)  (0.707)
Ianwts
In  (Senegcalese  0.476  OA18 Slilled and Unskilled)  (0386)  (0.422)
In(Ohe  African  1.71B-4  4AE-4 Skilcd and Unskcd)  ((3.4E-4)  (3.8E-4)
In (Non-African  8.0E-4  7.6134 Skilld and Unsklled)  3.9E-4  (4.3E-4)
In (Senegalese  Middle and  -1.6E-4  -1.9E-4 Upper Management)  (3.1E-4)  (3AE-4)
In (Other African  Middle  7.8E4  9.8E4 and Upper Management)  (5-5S-4)  (6.1E4)
In (Non-African  Middle  -3.014  -4AE4 and Upper Management)  (6.01E4)  (6.8E-4)
In (Unsillcd)  0.665  *  0
(0.215)1  0.732  0.81
(0Q176)  (0200)
In (Skilled)  6.514  (9.6E.4
(4.2134)  (4.8134)In (Middle  Ma  _et)  1.E-4  4AE4
(3.7E-4)  (4.3E-4)
In (Upper Mmangement)  7.85-4'  M9E-4e
(3.9E-4)  (4.4E-4)
In (Wage  Bill  1.9-E4  -725-S  -1.4B4  1.9E-4  -1.954  -3.454
Temporazy  Wovkers)  (3.9B.4)  (2.75.4)  (2.3E-4)  (4.3E54)  (3.15-4)  (2.7E4)
InK  0272  0383*  0394  0.417'  0394  OASe4
(0204)  (0.112)  (0.092)  (0224)  (0.128)  (0.105)
Tlue  0.035  0.108'  4.070  0.036  4.122  4.097'
(0.060)  (0.053)  (O.OB8)  (0.065)  (0.060)  (0.043)
0.913  0.896  0.913  0.929  0.907  0.923
N  54  54  54  54  54  54
,  Sqgi  cant at the  5 % statiscal test leveL
- Significant  at the 10 % statistical  test leveL
Our sample in this industty  consists  of 13 firms.
coTAUE  49
ol OIS I  Cbbdaum  wiai
F  - Vtimd.  - 1qC  t  Prim Vabue  Added
(Vibes  In plr_ahesea aw sandad  ers)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
In Domestic  Pricos  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  S  6
Intercept  1.396  0.864  0.907  0.449  -1.109  -1.711
(% Senegalese  Private)  (1.248)  (0.884)  (0.683)  (1.365)  (0.985)  (0.768)
Ownhiv:
% Senogalesw  State  0.576  -0.477  0.843  1.116  0599  -0.038
(1.026)  (0.916)  (0.759)  (1.122)  (1.019)  (0.854)
% French  0297  0.197  0309  -0395  4.417  -0227
(0299)  (035)  (0.259)  (0328)  (0398)  (0.291)
% Syro-Lebanese  0.481  0.050  -0.481  0.893  0.601  -. 092
(0.686)  (0.829)  (0.493)  (0.750)  (0.923)  (0.554)
% Other Foreign  -4515  4.634  0.494W  1-,11  -1263  .1139e
(0.301)  (0347)  (0282)  (0.3.9)  (0386)  (0317)
Trade  Variabls:
Effective  Rate of  0.017  0.018  0.026  40254*  0278  4.25?
Protection  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.030)% Exports  0.196  0.735'  0.488  0.202  OSS6  0506
(0370)  (0379)  (0350)  (0.405)  (0.423)  (0394)
Inputs:
h  (Senegalese  0.468*  0.424
Skiled and Unscilled)  (0.172)  (0.188)
In (Other African  0.892-4  031E-3
Skilled  and Unskilled)  (0.182-3)  (0.20E-3)
In (Non-Affican  0.39E-3*  032E-3
Skiled and Unskilled)  (0.23E-3)  (0.25E-3)
In ISeegalese Middle  0.53-S  -033E-4
and Upper Management)  (0.192-3)  (021EB-3)
In (Other African  Middle  0.55E-3'  0.69Ee3
and Upper Manigement)  (027E-3)  (029E-3)
In  (Non-Afnan Middle  0.27E-3  0.19E-3
and Upper Marnageent)  (038E-3)  (0.42E-3)
In (Unilled  Workers)  0.632  0.673'
(0.157)  A  S*  (0.174)
In (Skilled  Workcs)  0.24E-3 J(0  6  0.43B-r 3(0.153)
(022E-3)  (024E-3)Table 69 (Cont.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
In (Middle  Management)  (.15E-3  0.34E23
(0.24B.3)  (027B-3)
In (Upper Management)  0.428-3  0.451-3
(0288-3)  (0.328-3)
in (Wage  Bill of  0.45E4  -.9984  -. 41B-4  028S-4  .023E-3  4.148-3
'remporaiy Workers)  (0.198-3)  (0.178-3)  (0.15S-3)  (0.20E-3)  (0.19B-3)  (0.178-3)
InK  0.361*  0.4S7'  0.424'  0.491'  0A89  0A496
(0.119)  (0.096)  (0.084)  (0.131)  (0107)  (O.9S)
Time  -0.024  -0.091  40.063'  0.029  -0.106!  -.0A6
(0.043)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.038)
R2  0.926  0.910  0.914  0.939  0.924  0.926
N  S3  53  53  S3  S3  53
*  - Signifcant at the  5 %  atitical test leveL + - Sint  at the 10 % statistical tet  keveL
Our sample in this indust  conssts of 13 firmsTABLE 610
Se  JCb  and T  b  n-Mes:
IV  Psiht ofA  Cobb  Douglmz  nmuton
Fuions  - Dpendet  Vanable  o  Log of Cont  Price  Value Added
(Values in parentheses  are sandard errors)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  4.604  1838  0.451  -0.766  18.830  0268
(% Senegalese  Private)  (6.766)  (6.977)  (1,789)  (6.787)  (6.970)  (1.800)
ownership
% Selielese  State  -1.342  2.133'  -1309'  2.161'
(0.777)  (0.883)  (0.7&0)  (0O8M)
% French  -0423  3.038'  -0398  -3.123
(1387)  (1336)  (1391)  (1.33S)
%  *o-Lebanesc  -0.612  -2.459  45S1  -2.484
(0.814)  (0.790)  (0.17)  (0.789)
% Other Foip  -2279  2.658  -2.629  2.902
(5361)  (8.455)  (5373)  (8.449)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.401  -0.780  -0.232  4.183  -1.440  0.863'
Protection  (0.764)  (1.063)  (0208)  (0.767)  (1.062)  (0.209)
(Continue  OTable 6.10  (Con't.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
% Exports  -1.492  -1284  0.171  -1.528  -1.233  0.192
(1291)  (1.159)  (0.316)  (1295)  (1.159)  (0318)
Inouts:
In(Senegalese  Skinled  12??  1.262
and Unsilled)  (0.646)  (0.648)
In (Other African  -3.9E4  -3.6E-4
Skilled  and Unskiled)  (631E-4)  (6.3E-4)
In (Non-Afican  Skilled  -3213-4  -3.41-4
and  Unskilled)  (52E.4)  (5213-4)
In (Senegalese  Middle  -7.2E-5  -9.SE1S
and Upper Management  (SAE-4)  (5.4E3l)
In (Other  Afrcan  Middle  S.31-5  42E-S
and Upper Management)  (45EM4)  (45SE-4)
In (Non-African  Middle  -0.002'  -.002'
and  Upper Management)  (43-4)  (4AP-4)
In (Unsklled Wodcers)  036S  0382
(0.423)  0.906!  (0422)  0849 D  (0360)  J(0.362)
In (Skilled  Workers)  4.6B14  4.7E.4
(8.4134)  (8.4E4)In (Middlc Management)  0.002  0.002
(5.5134)  (55A4)
In (Upper  Management)  0.794  0.750
(0.635)  (0.635)
In (Wage Bill of  6.2E-4  4.6E14  1313-4  62E-4  4.6-4  1.IE-4
Temporary Workers)  (42E4)  (3.9E.4)  (2.OE-4)  (42E-4)  (3.9E-4)  (2.oE-4)
InK  0.152  -0.761  0204  0.164  -0.795  0239
(0.613)  (0.486)  (0.266)  (0.614)  (0.486)  (0268)
Time  -0.074  -0.051  -0.053  -0.076  -0.049  -0.05W
(0.069)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.070)  (0.045)  (0.033)
R2  0.946  0.923  0.923  0.962  0.945  0.939
N  51  51  62  51  51  62
Significant at the  5 % statistical test leveL
+  giciant  at the  10 %  statistical test leveL
Our sample in these  industries consists of 11 fums.TABLE 6.11
OI  P  &  f  d_  CObDOUw  proUin.
FuntiOns - Dependt  V  - ALog  of  4ns  Prilce  Vahie Added
(Values in parenthes  are standard eorn)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added in Domestic  PriCeS  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
InterCept  -1269  8.231  0227  -1.213  8595+  40.083 (% Senegalese  Private)  (3.480)  (4.462)  (1287)  (3.488)  (4.468)  (1-292)
Ownershin:
% Senegalese  State  -0.876+  Om82  4.851'  0.706
(0453)  (0575)  (0A54)  (0.576)
9%  French  0.569  '.261  0.565  -131S
(0552)  (0822)  (0553)  (0.23)
% SYrO-Lebane5C  0.204  -1.089  0.160  -1.128' (0.349)  (0.486)  (0.349)  (0.487)
% Other Foreign  -5298  .0.341  -5587  -0383
(2.180)  (4517)  (2.185)  (4524)
Trade Variables:
Effective  Rate of  0.318  -0504  .0-23S  -x282  -1.129  4.881 Protection  (0335)  (0560)  (0.103)  (0336)  (0561)  (0.103)% Export  -0.344  -0.203  0.125  -0.347  -0.175  0.134
Lts  13xporu(0.535)  (0.636)  (0276)  (0584)  (0.636)  (0.2)
10n2  deUonsl ed)  (0363)  (0364)
In(ter Afiican  -0512-S  0.102-4
USed  and Unskilled)  (0.23E-3)  (0.232-3)
In(Non-Afdcan  0.19B-3  0.17E-3
Sklled and Unskiled)  (021E-3)  (021E-3)
In (Senegalese  Middle  0.49E4  032E-4
and Upper Management)  (027E-3)  (0-27E-3)
In (Other African  Middle  033E-3-  033E-3r
and Upper Management)  (0.18E-3)  (0.18E-3)
In (Non-African  Middle  -0.13E2-  -0.14E-2
and Upper Management)  (026E-3)  (026E-3)
In (Un*sMcd  Workers)  0X431  0.449
(0309)  0) 7*  (00)4  0.766e
(0.160)  (0.160)
In (Skilled  Workers)  (0.46E-)  (0.3462-3)
In (Middle  Management)  0.11Ee22  0.11E22
(034E-3)  (0.34E-3)  (=ludTable 6.11  (Con't.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
In (Upper Managenent)  0571  0550
(0340)  (0341)
In (Wage  Bill of  025S1-3  02SE-3  1.31B4  02SE-3  026E-3  1.OE-4 Temporary Workers)  (0.201-3)  (0221-3)  (1.31-3)  (02DE-3)  (0.2-3)  (1.3B-4)
InK  0.153  4.134  0238  0.149  4.167  0296"
(0346)  (0319)  (0.149)  (0347)  (0319)  (0.150)
Tune  -0.034  4.068e  0.054  .0034  .0065+  -.057'
(0.039)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.032)
R2  0.963  0.944  0.923  0.9.74  0.960  0940
N  S0  S0  61  S0  S0  61
- Sgnificant  at the S % statsical  test leveL
-Sgnificant  at the 10 % statistical  test leveL
BDecause  of a relatively  serious multiolinearilys  problem, columns  3 and 6 present estimates  based on a specifcation without ownership  variables. Our sample in these industries  consists  of 11 rms.TABLE  6.12
Sao  (Pape A Wood  b:do
IV  E  _  *od4r  1!
um-  t r  V  - L  of Co  Price  V  Added
(Valu  it parethem  awe mdrd  arn)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Prices  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intercept  4.396  6.789  2392'  3588  8.093  2.600
(2X712)  (12 90)  (0.607)  (3.571)  (15.066)  (0.642)
Trsde Variablesy
Effective  Rate of  40.149  40.192  4.188  .0533  -0.696'  -0.679
Protection  (0.235)  (0.165)  (0.060)  (0309)  (0.192)  (0.063)
% Epors  -2.012  0.239  -OA51  -3.016  0.058  4.629
(1.725)  (4.272)  (0.677)  (2270)  (4.986)  (0.716)
InuLts:
In (Seealese  Silled  0.786  0.525
and Unskilled)  (0588)  (0.774)
-9.5E4  -0.001
Skiled and Unsklled  (8.7E-4)  (0.001)
(Contiued)
'ATable 6.12  (Cont.)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added
in Domestic  Pcs  in World Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
In (Non-African  Skilled  0.001  1.9E-3 and Unskilled)  (0.001)  (1.9E-3)
In (Sengese  Middle  -8.B-5  -3.7E-4 and Upper Management)  (5.91E4)  (7.8E.4)
In (Other African  Middle  0.001  1.0E.3 and Upper Management)  (9.6E-4)  (1.3E-3)
In (Unskled Workem)  0.848  0808 (0.637)  0  *  (0.743)  082
(0.143)  (0.152)
In (Skiled Workers)  7.134  1.1E&3
(1.1133)  (3
In (Middle Management)  -9.4E-5  -1.1E
(8.7B-4)  (1.OE-3)
In (Upper Managmentm)  26?E3  (.2B-3)
In (Wage  Bi  2.SB4  1.1E-4  32BA  6SE-4  1.8E-4  S5S14 Temhporary  Workers)  (4.3E-4)  (9.21.4)  (2.3E14)  (5.7E-4)  (1.13-3)  (2.4A4)InK  0.029  0203  0.145  0.208  -O2  0.142'
(0388)  (1.181)  (0.066)  (0O510)  (1378)  (0.)
Time  4.056  0.048  0.064  o.073  40.054  4.073'
(0.051)  (0.103)  (0.035)  (0.067)  (0.120)  (0.037)
R2  0.796  0.185  0853  0.827  0.456  0919
N  59  59  59  S9  59  59
- Sigificant at the S % stAtistical  test leveL
- Significant  at the 10 % statistical  test leve.
Our sample  in this industry  consists  of 10 and it contains  no state-owned  rm  or firs  employing  other African  middle  or upper
manaRers.  Many firns also display  missing  values  for ownership  and in the remaiing i-rrms  the ownership  variablos  are h-ghly
corrolied with the other esplanatory  varnables  (especially  the effective  rate of protection).  mhe  ownership  variables  are hence
excluded  in the above regressions.TABLE  6.13
Smg  (I!vc  uand  Wood Indstq.  OIS Egin  of Augmtd  Co  l!Oaiofin  FW  D  epatO  Vw  - ble  fig of  C  Price Vahe Add
(Values  in pareathes  re  amstandrd  aro)
Based on Value-Added  Based on Value-Added in Domestic  Prices  _  in World  Prices
1  2  3  4  5  6
Intaenpt  1-553  1.156  1.l82  1.871  1.459  2.092 (0.761)  (0.671)  (0.441)  (0.805)  (0.704)  (0.468)
Traoe Variables:
Effective  Rate of  4.061  4.122  4.126'  4.541  .061?  -0.6110 Protection  (0.062)  (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.066)  (0.055)  (0.052)
% Exports  4.712  4.026  0.123  -1.040e  4297  4.103 (0.567)  (0.516)  (0.498)  (0500)  (0.541)  (0529)
InPuts:
In (SeneZaese Skilled  0.48S  0.487 and Unskilled)  (0.139)  (0.147)
In (Other African  4026E-3  4029E-3 Skilled and Unskilled)  f0.13E-3)  (0.14E-3)In (Non-ncan  Skilled  036-3)  038SE-
and Unskilled)  (021E-3)  (0.23E-3)
In (Snegam  seMiddle  0368.4  0.74E-4
and Upper Management)  (0.17E-3)  (0.18E-3)
In (Non-African  Middle  03103  02E-3
Upper Management)  (028E-3)  (030E3)
In (Unskilled  Workers)  0377  0.339
(0.111)  05,  (0.117)  0504*
(0.104)  (0.111)
In (Skilled  Workers  0.20E-3  039E-3
(020E-3)  (021E-3)
In (Middle  Management)  (027E-3  (02.883)
In (Upper Managemet)  .0273  -0.25-3
(0.15E-3)  (0.16E-3)
In (Wage  Bill of  0268-3  023E-3  0358-3  038E3'  -033E3'  0.47-31
Temporry Wodkers)  (0.16E-3)  (0.161-3)  (0.148-3)  (0.17E-3)  (0.17E-3)  (0. 15-3)
(Continued)Table 6.13 (Con'L)
Based on Value-Added  Based on VaheAdded in Domestic Prices  _  in Wodd PEiop  g
1  2  3  4  S  6
InK  0.331*  0380*  0.284'  0313*  037  0.274' (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.043)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.046)
rime  4082'  4O.W65  -0.062  40.090*  4.07  -OC7* (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033)
R2  0.903  0.894  0.882  0.947  0.943  0.935
N  S8  S8  58  58  58  58
*  Ski;ficant  at the S % statistical test level or better. +  - Significant at the 10 % statistical test level or better. Our sample in this industry consists of 10 frm  and it contans  no state-owned fums or firms emploing  other African middle or upper manages  Many fums also display mssg  us  for ownerp  and in the remaining frms  te  ownrship  variables are higbly correlated wnth the other  explanatory variables (espcialy  the effecive  rate  of proteaion).  The  ownership variables am hbene excluded in the above regressions.7
Econometric  Estimates
of the Determinants of Wages
In this section we use individual  worker data from the 17-firm
sample to  explain wage differentials in terms of productivity-
related and other characteristics  of individuals.  Because the cross
tabulations in Chapter 4 indicate that earnings  differentials  widen
when viewed in terms of an individual's total compensation as
opposed to base salary, we estimate the earnings functions  using
both  total  compensation and  base  salary as  the  dependent
variables.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 7.1. They
indicate that the male-female earnings differential is significant
and widens  when total compensation  is considered, in comparison
to  the  base salary.  Controlling for differences in  education,
experience, nationality and other  explanatory variables, males
earn on average 17.8 percent more than females in base salaq
and 19.2 percent in total compensation.
Earnings differentials are enormoujs  between the non-African
and African groups:  After controlling  for differences in education,
experience,  gender, and other explanatory  variables,  non-Africans
are on average found to earn from 123 percent to  142 percent
more than Africans. 1 In contrast, there is no noticeable earnings
differential between similar other Africans and Senegalese,  which
is consistent with the information gathered from our interviews
with the managers.  Other  Africans tend to be employed in the
1. The differential  between  non-Africans  and Africans  does not increase  when
total compensation  is  considered. This may  be accurate  as we understand  that the
extra pay  of expatriates  comes  in the form  of both extrm  base pay and supplements.
Unfortunately,  some of the extra supplements  come  in benerits  'in  kind,' such as
housing,  for  which  we  could not  gather data and which  would  probably  increase  the
relatve total earnings  differentiaL102
lower skilled  jobs and employers find no need to pay them more
than comparabie Senegalese.
TAB  7.1
SaiepL~  Itates  of JnA  a
Earaap  PwIm  BEed one
P&aml  and Enacia  t  Cu  C
(Vab..  in puarbes=  we ntandard  arm)
Dependent Varable  - Dependent Variable -
Monthly  Base Salary  Monthly  Total Earnings
1  2
azercept  9.639*  9.942'
(0.137)  (0.194)
male  0.178e  0.192"
(0.071)  (0.100)
Other  Aian  02S5  .237
(0.188)  (0266)
Non-Acan  1.420  1.23?
(0.193)  (02)
Union Member  -0.016  0.133
(0.060)  (0.085)
EducaOion  0.074'  0.111'
(0.006)  (0.007)
Labor Force  0.007'  ').016
Ezperenc  (0.003)  (0.004)
Firm.pecdIc  0.018*  0.020'
Exp.riene  (0-003)  (0.004)
Trainbg  0.108'  0.098
(0.038)  (0.054)
% Senegene  Q0a24  0.669"
Stae  Owned  (0.M)  (038S)103
% French  0.284  0.117
(0.083)  (0.116)
% Syro.Lebanese  .0.084  .0293'
(0.090)  (0.1M
% Other Foreign  (0306)  0.748
(0.118)  (0.168)
Effective  Rate of  0.020  Q005
Protecion  (0.012)  (0.017)
% Exports  0.217*  0.137
(0.083)  (0.118)
Not Revenue  .0.30E-4  .0.29E.4
Per Worker  (0.23E-4)  (0-33E-4)
Sales Growth  0.820  1.018'
Over 5  Years  (0323)  (0.456)
RZ  0.45  0.49
N  S13  513
*  ,  dsnificant at 5 % stistical  test leveL
+  - signifcant at 10 % staistical test leveL
Source:  Worker data from 17 firms
,he  results in Table 7.1 suggest that union membership does
not  significantly improve most  workers'  base  wage  or  total
earnings.  Once the effects of firm ownership and the workers
nationality,  sex, education,  and experience  are taken into account,
trade  union  membership does  not  appear  to  add  to  one's
earnings. This finding could be exFlained by the fact that our
sample contains very few nonunionized workers and  that the
government extends the terms of the collective agreement to
nonunionized workers as well. However, these findings are also
consistent with those from our interviews,  where it became clear
that unions are seen primarily as protectors of the workers' job
rights and enforcers of the Labor Code. For example,  they protect
the day laborer's right to obtain a permanent job after having
worked for a specified length of time.
Each additional year of education raises the base salary by 7.4
percent  and  the  total  compensation by  11.1 percent.  These104
estimates  fall within  the range of the estimates  of the effects  of
education  on earnings in the Third World. 2 Moreover,  the
higher  return in total compensation  (as compared  to base salary)
reflects  the extra  premiums  that are given  to the more educated
middle  level  managers.
We looked  at experience  in terms of work  prior to and within
the firm  of current employment  to test the hypothesis  that there
is a higher  return on each year of experience  within  the firm of
employment  than on years of expenence  prior to entering  the
firm. The results indicate that the return is indeed higher for
firm-specific  experience  (1.8  percent)  compared  to general  labor
force  experience  (0.7  percent)  for one's  base  salary.  However,  one
year of experience  within  or outside  the firm  has approximately
the same payoff for total earnings-2 percent vs. 1.6 percent,
respectively.  Managers hence appear to be awarding  greater
supplements  to employees  with more labor force experience.
This is also clear from comparing  the coefficient  on labor force
experience  in columns  1 and 2 of Table  7.1.
The coefficierit  on training indicates that those who have
received  some  training  in the firm  earr,  approximately  10gPercent
more each month than those  who  hav<  not been trained. Is this
earnings  differential  the result of internal  training-that is, does
training  bring  about a productivity  differential  or are those  who
have  been trained  a select  group  because  they  appear  to be more
productive?  This is an old question in the literature, which,
although  clearly  not answered  within  this framework,  could  be the
subject  of a separate  study. However,  the coefficient  reflects  the
importance  of job-specific  training.  Unions  have  complained  that
firms  have  been  shortsighted  in not training  their employees.  It is
true that the  questionnaire  responses  indicated  that  only  one-third
of the workers  had received  training  by  the enterprise  and that on
average thle training period was short; almost one-half (47
percent) of the training  was for a duration of less than three
months.
2.  See, e.g., Psacharopoulos  (1981,  1985)  for estimates  of the effect  of human
capital on earnings  in the Third World2
3. Tle coefficient  is  practicaly constant  across  both regressions  (columns  1 and
2 in Table 7.1), indicating  that there are no extra rewards  in total compensation
as compared to base sdlary.105
We also tested for systematic  variation in salary of workers in
private domestic-owned  firms, publicly owned firms, or  French,
Syro-Lebanese or  'other  foreign' owned firms by including a
variable indicating  percent of capital owned by each of these
groups.  Since these are not dummy variables, the coefficients
reflect the percent  differential in a worker's earnings orought
about by a one percentage increase in, for example, French or
Syro-Lebanese  ownership  of  the  firm.  Consequently,  the
differentials can be calculated  for a firm with ownership  by more
than one of these categories. Domestic  private ownership  is used
as the base  (intercept).  The results for base salary and total
earnings are presented in Table 7.1.
With respect to base salary,  it appears that the publicly  owned
and  Syro-Lebanese firms pay about the  same as the  private
domestic-owned firms, whereas the  French and  other foreign
firms pay significantly  higher base salaries-28.4 percent and 30.6
percent more, respectively.  However, when calculated with total
earnings, the  differentials are  quite different.  Whereas other
foreign firms continue to be  in the top  position (paying 74.8
percent  more than private domestic firms), French firms now
appear not to be paying more than private domestic firms, and
the public firms appear to be paying  the second highest average
total  compensation (66.9 percent more than private domestic
firms).  We learned from our interviews  that the French tend to
upgrade employees through the categories (defined in terms of
the base salary) faster than the private domestic firms and that
they do this instead of awarding  more benefits, which  would help
explain  our  findings from  this  regression. Interestingly, and
consistent with the information gathered from interviews with
managers and union officials,  the Syro-Lebanese  firms appear to
be paying 29.3 percent less than the private domestic firms with
respect to total compensation. Therefore, they tend to pay what
the government requires them to pay with respect to base salary
but add no compensatory supplements or benefits.
We were  also  interested in  assessing the  effects of  trade
variables on workers' earnings, i.e., do firms that export more
and/or are more protected from imports  pay higher salaries? The
results  indicate  that the firm's  rate of effective  protection  had no
significant  impact on salary levels.  On the other hand, firms that
export a higher proportion of their product do tend to pay slightly
higher salaries. Firms which export 100 percent of their product106
pay an average of 21.7 percent more in terms of base salary than
those who do not export any of their product, but no more in
terms of total compensation.
Finally, we tested for the effect of the firm's profitability and
growth on workers' salaries. Profitability  and output growth are
frequently  hypothesized to  have  a  positive effect  on  wages
because they reflect the firm's ability to pay.  According to this
hypothesis, firms with a greater ability to pay, are able to pay
higher wages to otherwise  identical workers. However,  in testing
this hypothesis, one cannot use actual profit data because profit
is measured net of actual wages  (i.e., it is  the revenue minus labor
cost minus nonlabor cost).  It hence reflects the firm's ability to
pay the owners of capital once workers have been paid, rather
than capturing the  nr.'s ability to pay workers. In view of this
measurement probiem, wc use the firms net revenue per worker-
-defined as the revenue minus nonlabor cost per worker-as  the
appropriate proxy for the firm's ability to pay.  The net revenue
measure is conceptually more appropriate than profit because it
reflects the total 'pie  that can be divided  between employees and
capital owners. It hence defines the maximum  amount that could
be allocated to wages.
As the estimated coefficients in Table 7.1 indicate, we found
no relationship between a firm's net revenue per worker and the
base salary (wage) or total compenration. However, firms that
have been growing faster do  seem to  be paying higher base
salaries and greater total compensation. The relevant  coefficients
in Table 7.1 indicate that a  1 percent increase in annual sales
growth (over the five years preceding the year of the current
observation) would  lead to a 0.82  percent increase in base salaries
and a 1.02  percent increase in total compensation.8
Industrial Wages and the
Extended Family
The  government  of  Senegal  and  the  trade  unions  have
expended a great deal of effort to protect the wages of industrial
workers. While the data presented in Chapter 4 indicate that in
recent years this effort has not prevented real wages from falling,
questions arise as to the possible effects of this effort and of
movements in real wages in general.  Since the 1950s,  there has
been  a  general  b,elief that  a  higher income  induces  larger
extended families,  such that consumption  per capita of the worker
and the worker's family remains constant but the consumption of
the extended family is slightly  increased.
As Pfeffermann (1968) pointed out in his book on industrial
workers in Senegal,
Income figures  per worker convey  a highly  misleading  image of standards of
living. They merely  constitute  a frst  step in an attempt to find out how the
standard of living  of urban industrial  workers  compares  with that of peasants
or other fractions  of the population. In a society  in which  the 'extended  famiy
system  prevails,  the number of dependents  who are fed (and often clothed)  at
the wage-earners'  sole expense,  thereby  curtailing  his  income,  must  be taken into
account. (p. 167).
Similarily,  since the publication of the influential development
models  by  Todaro  (1969) and  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),
development economists and  policy makers have viewed the
relative  behavior  of  urban  wages and  rural  incomes as  an
important determinant of rural-urban migration. The prediction
of these models is that only  a fraction of the rural migrants obtain
modem sector jobs, while the rest of them live with relatives in
the urban area and engage in modern sector job search as well as
informal economic activities. An implication  of this prediction is
that the size of the extended urban family is positively  correlated
with wages in the urban modern sector, although the impact on108
welfare  (living standards)  depends  on  a  number of  factors,
including  earnings in the informal urban sector, rural incomes,  etc.
In this chapter we examine the structure of extended families
in the Dakar area  and analyze the relationship between wages
and family size.
8.1 Size of Extended Famlies
The extended family can be defined as the urban and rural
group of persons who partly or entirely depend on the income of
one wage earner  for subsistence. (Pfeffermann considered only
the urban group.)  The extended family can be broken down into
the  nuclear  family, comprising the  wage earners'  wives and
children, and the non-nuclear farmily,  comprising  other relatives.
An analysis  of the size of the extended family alters the image
of per capita incomes of individual  workers considerably: Both
nuclear and non-nuclear families  are remarkably  large in Senegal
-the  former as a resul'  of the absence of birth control and the
prevalence of polygamy, and  the latter because of traditional
family solidarity.
o.lI  Nuclear  Families
In examining  the number of wives  of male workers  in our study,
we found that the extent of polygamy  has not declined during the
23 years since Pfeffermann completed his study; in fact, it may
have slightly  risen (see Table 8.1).
The typical family in our 1986 sample is very large-possibly
larger than the typical family in the 1963 sample of 188  workers
from 13 industrial firms. As can be seen in Table 8.2, the average
number of children for monogamous  workers was 3.08 in 1963
and 5.08 in 1986.  For polygamous  workers, the average number
was nearly twice as large in both years: 5.93 in 1963 and 9.88 in
1986.  The  total  average number of children per  worker in
Pfeffermann's 1963 sample is 3.41 and in our 1986 sample it is
5.87. Moreover, it appears that fewer Senegalese  workers are now
childless. Or, conversely,  whereas 75 percent of the 1963  sample
of workers had  one or more children, the figure rose to  91.4
percent in the 1986 sample.
If the  1963 and  1986 samples of workers are representative,
they clearly indicate a substantial increase in family size.  Not
only has the number of children and wives  per family increased,109
"bl  8A
Senegp  Distrion  of Mae Woks
byMNrhi SM  u
1963  1986
Single  13.8  10.1
One wife  612  63.1
Two wives  213  20.9
Three or more wives  3.7  4.6
Widowed  or
divorced  - 4
Sourfv: 1963  - Pfeffermann  (1968),  p. 168
1986  - Worker sample,  1986  survey  of 17 industrial  firms
TABLE 82
SenegaL  Avwaig Number of Ch&.
by Markel  Sat
1963  1986
Monogamous  3.08  5.08
Polygamous  5.93  9.88
Total  3A1  5.87
Source: 1963  - Pfeffermann  (1968),  p. 168
1986  - Worker sample,  1986  survey  of 17 industrial  firms.
but the number of children per worker has also jumped. The rise
in the average number of children is consistent with the rapid
population  growth  rates  reported  by  the  official  statistics
(averaging 2.9 percent per year between 1972 and  1982) and it
can probably be explained  by the constant fertility rate and falling
mortality rate.110
&1.2 Non-nuclear  Familes
The  average number of persons maintained at the worker's
expense is even greater than the statistics concerning wives and
children would suggest. Unemployed  relatives  enjoy the frequent
hospitality  of wage earners and often  join their households. Non-
nuclear  families typically consist of  elderly relatives and  the
children of brothers and sisters from the provinces.
The data on the number of people who are regularly fed (and
sometimes clothed, in  the case of the Pfeffermann data)  are
astounding by American and European standards. It should be
noted that these figures do not include the numerous temporary
guests who come to stay in town for periods ranging from a few
days to several weeks.  Again, if the two samples  are representative
and, moreover, if the question was indeeJ asked4in  the same way,
the figures indicate that  the size of the extended non-nuclear
family has increased since 1963.  Pfeffermann found that  the
average worker in 1963 fed (and sometimes clothed) 9.6 people
including himself.  In  1986 the average worker fed about 11.9
people  including himself (we did not  include clothing in  our
study). Table 8.3 shows the frequency  distribution of the workers
by size of extended family. Note that 16 percent of the workers
each  supported  14  or  more  people  in  1963; in  1986 the
corresponding proportion rose to 35 percent.
In seeking to explain this pattern, we conjecture that increased
size of the extended family  is in part a result of the deterioration
in  Senegal's economic performance.  In particular, with rising
unemployment,  stagnant industrial employment,  and a decline in
GNP per capita, holding a job has become more of a "privilege."
Those who are now in this privileged minority are expected to
shoulder heavier family responsibilities.  The results of our study
are  consistent  with  this  explanation  and  also  supports
Pfeffermann's  finding (1968, p.  221) that  there  is  a  pattern
between the size of the extended family  and the age of the worker.
Pfefferman noted that older workers  tend to have larger extended
families; our data reinforce this relationship. Table 8.4 presents
the data from both surveys.111
TABLE 83
Senepl: Disrbuo  n  Wof 
by Size of  Baed F
Family Size  1963  1986
2 to 4  14.2  5.2
5 to 7  25.5  12.2
8 to 10  27.5  22.0
11 to 13  17.0  21.2
14 to 16  7.0  15.2
17 or more  9.0  19.8
Total  100.0  100.0
*Extended  family  is defined as the number  of people fed regulary
in the workees home.
Source:  1963  - Pfeffermann  (1968),  p. 169.
1986  - Worker  sample,  1986 urvey  of 17 industrial  firms.
In both samples the proportion of those under 31 who support
10 or more people is far below the proportion of the oldest group
(over 40) who support this number. In comparison, only 7 percent
of the oldest group were supporting fewer than 6 people in 1986,
whereas  43 percent  of  those  under 31  were  supporting this
relatively small number of people.
How  does  this  pattern--that  older workers  support  larger
extended families--help  explain the finding  (in Table 8.3) that the
extended families were considerably  larger in 1986 as compared
to 1963?  The answer can be seen in the last row of Table 8.4,
which shows the proportion of workers  in each age group for the
two survey  years. It is clear that workers in 1986  were on average
older  than  workers  in  1963.  If  this  age  distribution  is
representative  of  the  entire  population  of  workers  in  the
industrial  sector,  then  a  strong  presumption  exits  that  the
combined  forces  of  government  regulation  and  economic
deterioration are halting the employment  of new (young) workers112
TAE  8.A
SwnopL  Cram  Tmbuat  of Wodue
Age ad  Sim of  Zaided Famiy
AGE  GROUP
1963  1986
Number of  Under  31 to  Over  Under  31 to  Over
Dependents  31  40  40  31  40  40
lessthan6  63  22  17  43  15  7
6 to 9  26  35  22  22  29  17
i0 and more  11  43  61  35  56  76
Total:  100  %  100  %100 %  100  %  100  %100 %
Age Distnbution:  29 %  38 %  33 %  20 %  39 %  40 %
Source: 1963  - Pfeffermann  (1968),  p. 221.
1986  - Worker sample, 1986  stuvey  of 17 industria fums.
and hence creating an older industrial work force in Senegal.  The
older workers, now a larger proportion of the pool of employed,
are bearing a larger share of the family support burden.
However, from Table 8.4 it is also clear that within each age
group the burden of responsibility has grown since 1963.  For
example, whereas only 11  percent of those under 31 supported 10
or more people in 1963,  in 1986  over one-third (35 percent) of
this  group  were  supporting  10  or  more  people.  Similarly,
76 percent of workers over 40 were supporting 10 or more people
in 1986,  as compared to just 61 percent for this category in 1963.
8.2 Rclationship Between Earnings
and the Extended Family
One  of  the  findings from Pfeffermann's (1968) analysis of
Senegal's labor market was that some employers believed that
higher incomes did not necessarily lead to higher consumption
patterns for the worker and the nuclear family.  Some employers
felt that higher incomes either (1) induced more migration of113
marginal relatives  from the rural areas to the town or (2) induced
the worker to inc-ease the number of people supported in the
extended family.
After excluding  young  workers  living  with ti,eir fathers and not
in charge of a family,  Pfeffermann (1968, p. 2W9)  found, that the
coefficient of correlation between total wage compensation and
the number of people maintained by the worker was 0.319.  That
Is to say for every 1 percent increase in monthly earnings, the
typical industrial worker would support  0.3 percent  additional
people. The relationship existed  but was not very strong, as shown
FIGURE 8.1
Se  - hRdBeme





up to  11-  15-  19-  27-  3-  over
10,000  14,999  18,99  22,999  26,999  30,999  39,999  39,999
Source: Pfeffennann  (1968,  p. 220)
in  Pfeffermann's diagram (reproduced  as Figure 8.1) plotting
income against number of dependents.
1. Pfeftennann claims  there is no evidence  that the flow  of money  transferred
by industrial  workers  to relatives  in the country  increases  with  income. If anything,
the evidence  suggests  that younger  workers  tend to send larger amounts of money
homne  than do older oneL114
Our data also indicate that the size of the extendec family--in
terms  of  number  of  people  fed-increases  as  income  rises,
although the relationship is not very strong (see Table 8.5). When
we regressed the number of people fed by a Senegalese industrial
worker on the worker's base wage and total compensation, we
found small but statistically significant  coefficients on the wage
variables (Table 8.5). However,  the wage variables only explain 2
percent  of  the  variance  in  the  number  of  extended  family
members.  Our  data  therefore  support  the  hypotheses that
industrial wages have a positive  effect on the size of the extended
family, but the explanatory power of our results is very small.
TABLE 8.5
Senegal Corelation beaween  Sie  of Estended
Family and Workers Eanis
(Dependent Variable: Number of people fed)
Independent
Variables:  Coefficient  t  Statistic
Intercept  11.6  10.6
Total Compensation  38E-5  23
Base Salary  .23E14  3.4
.02
558
Source:  1986  - Worker  sample, 1986  survey  of 17
industrial  firms.
Sample - Senegalese  workers only.
8.3 Secondwy Income
The effect of the extended family  on the worker's standard of
living becomes clearer when one realizes that  the  earnings a
worker  receives from  a  job  in  the  industriaW  sector  usually
represent  his/her  total  earnings. In  other  words, there  are
relatively few workers who either earn income from a secondary
activity or who have a secondary earner in the household. This115
phenomenon  is  found  in  both  Pfeffermann's and  our  data.
Pfeffermann  (1968)  found  that  17  percent  of  his  sample
occasionally earned some extra money from moonlighting,  but
in  our  sample  the  percentage  is  much  lower--5 percent. 2
Lachaud's (1987) study of workers in state owned firms finds that
11.8 percent of these workers have at least one other source of
income.  These findings suggest that the extent of moonlighting
by industrial workers has been decreasing over time, and that in
the 1980s  the phenomenon is more prevalent among workers in
government owned rather than private firms.
Except in the case of young unmarried workers living in their
parents' homes, it is rare to find more than one wage earner per
household. As soon as job seekers find stable employment, they
set  up  their  own households.  In  response  to  our  question
regarding secondary  earners in the household, only 7.7 percent of
our sample indicated there were others in the home contributing
to  the  family income.  This  answer  may  have  been  biased
downward because the question also asked how much was being
contributed by others in the family. However, it is interesting to
note that only 12 percent of the women indicated that there was
another  person  in  the  household contributing to  the  family
income and that 7 percent of the men said their spouse or some
other family  member was contributing.  Pfeffermann  found that 2.2
percent of the men in his survey had wives who earned money.
As with moonlighting,  there appears to be a different pattern of
household labor force participation in the case of public sector
employees.  In particular, Lachaud (1987) finds that about one-
third of state enterprise workers in his sample live in households
with two or more wage earners and that more than one-half of
these secondary earners also work in the public sector.
In summary, neither our nor Pfeffermann's findings strongly
support the industrialists' argument that increases in industrial
wages do not translate directly into increases in the worker's
consumption and standard of living.  The cross sectional evidence
for 1963 and 1986 indicates at best a weak positive relationship
between the size of extended families  and income.  A simple  linear
regression of earnings and the size of extended family produces
2.  This statistic  may be another reflection  of the deterioration  in Senegars
economic  conditions.116
a very small positive coefficient. Moreover, this  regression only
explains 2 percent of the variance in extended family size.
What has become very clear from the analysis of the extended
family is that its size has increased over time due to the aging of
the  industrial work  force  and  to  the  increased  number  of
dependents within each aLe group. We surmise that the larger
extended  family  dependency  ratio'  has  arisen  from  a
deterioration in economic conditions  in Senegal. The few people
whc  are  fortunate  to  have jobs  in  the  industrial sector  are
supporting a larger pool of unemployed.  Moreover, because of the
stagnation  in industrial employment,  the employed increasingly
tend to be older workers.
The extent of moonlighting  by industrial workers is limited, as
is the frequency of finding more than one income earner in the
families of these workers.  The exception is the public sector
where both phenomenon appear to be more pronounced.9
Summary and Policy Implications
Senegal's  economy  has  been  characterized  by  long-term
stagnation and, in terms of many indicators, even decline. In the
industrial labor market, which is the focus of our analysis, the
situation has been reflected in the virtually stagnant employment
levels of full-time workers and in falling real wages. In view of
these developments, the aim of this study has been to describe
how Senegal's industrial labor market functions and to examine
the effects of the industrial relations system, major institutions,
and principal structural factors on economic performance.
9.1  Summary
1. The modem industrial labor market is heavily regulated by
the  government. The  regulations may be  aimed  at  advancing
workers' welfare, but it is questionable whether they are having
this  effect; instead, these regulations have resulted in  higher
production costs and reduced flexibility  of industrial enterprises.
The workweek is fixed by law, and  managers feel particularly
constrained by their  inability to  lay off workers without first
passing through  an  elaborate and  time-consuming process of
government approvaL The difficulties associated with extending
the  contracts  of temporary (daily) workers are  also cited as
significant  constraints on enterprise behavior.
2.  The industrial sector is heavily unionized, but the unions
are  in  many respects weak and  workers do  not  seem  to  be
enthusiastic  about their achievements.  The major influence  of the
unions comes from their ability to  induce the government to
institute and enforce the aforementioned regulations.  Their other
effect comes from being partners in a highly  adversarial system  of
industrial relations. The system is tripartite  (unions-employers-
government) in nature and is characterized by deep mistr;ast-118
especially between the unions and employers.  Its negative effect
on efficiency  may appears to be considerable.
3.  Low worker effort, motivation,  and discipline are cited by
managers  as  major causes for  the low labor productivity of
Senegal's major industries.  This phenomenon is exacerbated by
employers'  opposition to  unions, by the  union  position that
workers must resist employer exploitation,  and by the lack of a
direct  link  between performance and  remuneration  in  most
enterprises.
4. Another reason for the low level of labor productivity  is the
limited availability of skilled workers and what appears to be a
secular decrease in the provision of on-the-job  training by firms.
There has been a widening  of the total compensation  differential
between skilled and unskilled  employees  without  a corresponding
increase in the skilled labor supply. This  low supply response is
caused, to  a great degree, by limled  educational and training
opportunities; it can also be attributed to the many difficulties
faced by individuals in obtaining credit to finance their training
and by the fact that higher income tends to some extent increase
the worker's dependency burden through the influx  of additional
relatives into the extended family.
5. Our econometric estimates  provide a number of important
insihts  into the determinants of enterprise productivity:
(i)  Overall, one cannot find a significant  relationship between
total factor productivity  (TFP) and enterprise ownership, except
in the Syro-Lebanese  firms,  whose  estimated  TFP is 30-50  percent
below that of other firms; the Syro-Lebanese  firms also provide
comparatively  lower compensation  to their employees.
(id) The impact of ownership on TFP varies by industry: In the
food industry, firms with greater Senegalese  state and/or foreign
(other than French) ownership are more productive than other
firms; in the chemical and extraction industries,  firms with more
French and other foreign ownership  are more productive than
others; somewhat weaker statistical evidence suggests  that firms
with 'other  foreign' ownership tend to be less productive than
others in the mechanical industry;
(iii) Effective (trade) protection has a major negative effect on
TFP, but  enterprise export orientation displays no productivity
effect;
(iv) Although non-Africans are on average paid 123-142  percent
more  than  comparable  Africans,  the  estimated  marginal119
productivity  of  non-African  employees  is not  significantly  different
from  zero  (i.e.,  removing  one  non-African  employee  would  not,  on
average,  affect  output);
(v) At  the industrial-sector  level, there was a  detectable  5-7
percent average annual decline in TFP during the  1980-1985
period; industry-specific  analysis  indicates that this decline  is
ev.dent in the food and mechanical  industries,  less so in the
textile,  clothing  and leather  industry  but not at all in the chemical
and extraction  industries.
6.  Because of  falling  real base wages, the share of the
employer-determined  wage supplements  in total compensation
has increased  dramatically  over time,  as did the use of temporary
(daily)  workers.  lihe  latter phenomenon  is in part a reaction  to
the regulatory  burden in the labor market. Both phenomena
reflect an  increase in  the  decisionmaking  flenxbility  of  the
employers.
7. The pattern of enterprise ownership has a significant  effect
on wages  (earnings):  Non-French,  foreign-owned  firms pay the
highest  wages,  and local Syro-Lebanese  firms pay the lowest;
greater export-orientation  of a firm is associated  with slightly
higher  base wage  but not total earnings;  effective  protection  has
no noticeable  effect  on wages;  and finally,  there appears  to be a
highly  significant  positive  relationship  between  the output  growth.
of the firm and the wages  it pays.
8.  The size of the industrial  worker's extended  family has
increased over time. Deteriorating  economic  conditions have
increased  the 'dependency  ratio' for each employed  worker  and
through  reduced  hiring,  have  created  an older  labor f',rce that is
traditionally  expected  to support more dependents. Eaxtended
families  of industrial  workers  frequently  rely on the breadwinners
wage  as the sole source  of income;  in the public  sectoi, families
are often composed  of more  than one wage  earner.
92  Policy  Implications
Our qualitative  and  quantitative  findings  suggest  that Senegars
industry has  suffered from a  highly adversarial system of
industrial  and  labor  relations,  excessive  government  regulations  in
many  areas alongside  insufficient  government  support  in others;
and  numerous misperceptions  about  the  influence of  the120
ethnically  diverse labor force and enterprise ownership.  Our
specific  policy  conclusions  are as follow.
1. The lackluster  performance  of Senegal's  economy  and our
findings  about  the industrial  labor  market  underscore  the need  for
effective  policies  geared  toward  long-term  growth  in productivity,
employment  and earnings.  Our numerous  discussions  with the
three social  partners  give  us  a definite  impression  that  the country
needs to adopt social compact  that would  replace the existing
highly adversarial system of industrial relations with greater
cooperation  among  the partners.  In order to reap the benefits
that  such a  system could bring in  terms of  greater effort,
motivation,  and labor  productivity,  it would  be highly  desirable  to
link a part of worker  compensation  (e.g.,  the wage  supplement)
to specific  individual  or group  performance  indicators.
2.  Because  the  current  regulations contnbute  to  the
underutilization of  labor, a  relaxation of  the  regulations
concerning (paid) hours of  work, layoffs,  and  the  use of
temporary  (daily)  workers  would,  along  with transfer  payments,
improve  the welfare  of all the parties.
3. The limited extent of training  programs  for workers  is a
serious problem that may require government  intervention.  If
firms do not provide  optimal  amounts  of training  because  they
have  to bear the training  cost  and fear being  subsequently  raided
by other firms, some form of collective  action or government
intervention  may  be needed.
4.  The fact that no particular  type of ownership  has had a
detectable  overall  productivity  advantage,  and that certain  types
of ownership  display  higher  productive  efficiency  than others in
specific  industries  suggests  that policies  geared  toward  changing
enterprise ownership or  providing  preferential treatment to
certain types of  ownership should be based on  a  careful
examination  of specific  cases.  In particular,  case study  evidence
suggests  that a number  of enterprises  are in need of closure  or
rehabilitation.  However,  the econometric  evidence  indicates  that,
if productive  efficiency  is an important  criterion,  policies  in this
area cannot be in the form of general rules based solely on
ownership  (e.g.,  privatization, Senegalization,  preferential
treatment of foreign  capital,  etc.).
5.  The econometric  findings-that  effective  protection  has a
negative effect on enterprise productivity  (measured  in world
prices)  and no effect  on wages-are  strong  and precise.  Within  the121
general development policy debate, these  findings provide
important support for the argument  that protection  generates
inefficiency.  They also indicate  that this inefficiency  is not an
economic  rent that would  be reflected in higher wages. The
results suggest  that the recent  policies  aimed at reducing  trade
protection should have a positive  effect on productivity,  thus
making  firms  more  capable  of facing  foreign  competitors  and  pass
on the benefits  of improved  efficiency  to consumers  in the form
of lower prices. The overall impact  of reduced protection of
course depends  on a number  of factors,  including  the proportion
of firms  that survive  the adjustment  process  and the extent  of new
investment  in the country.
6.  Our analysis  indicates  that the extent of an enterprises
export orientation is not related to productive  efficiency;  this
finding  has important  implications  for both the general debate
about optimal  development  policy  and for Senegal  in particular.
It contradicts  the hypothesis  that firms in developing  countries
can increase  their  productive  efficiency  by  greater  exposure  to the
world market: On the one hand,  because  we are able to control
for the extent of effective  protection  in our sample,  we are able
to test this hypothesis  very  carefully.  On the other hand,  because
many  of the exporting  firms  in our sample  export  only  to other
West  African  countries,  the argument  about  the efficiency  gained
from exposure  to the world  market  may  not be fully  tested.
7. The finding  that a large  part of Senegal's  industrial  sector
may be  experiencing  a  significant  decline in  total  factor
productivity  signals  a potential  long-term  problem  that should  be
explored  within  the ongoing  New  Industrial  Policy.  Although  it is
difficult  within the context  of this study to pinpoint the exact
determinants  of this  decrease  in productivity,  our discussions  with
managers, workers, and trade union leaders suggest that the
unwillingness  of firms  to invest  in physical  and human  capital,  in
combination with  labor  market  and  other  governmental
regulations,  has contributed  to the decline.
8.  The exodus of the highly  paid non-Africans  has been
welcomed  by the proponents  of Senegalization  and viewed  with
suspicion  by those  who  perceive  the departure as a serious  loss
of highly  productive  human  capitaL  Our econometric  estimates
suggest  that, on the margin,  the productivity  of the non-African
labor input is zero. This implies  that, although  the  average
contribution  of non-Africans  may  be high,  their gradual exodus122
appears ta  have benefited Senegal's economy,  with further gains
to  be realized as the number of non-Africans on the payrolls
gradually decLies.
9.  The dual find-..g that the return (in termzs  of earnings) on
firm-specific experience is higher than the return  on  general
experience and that the effect of firm-specific  training on earnings
is high suggests  that the New Industrial Policy  should  give special
consideration to retraining the displaced workers  within existing
firms rather than outside of them.
10. The effect that deteriorating economic  conditions is having
on  the  size  of workers'  extended families suggests that  the
burdens of  rising unemployment and limited hiring of young
workers are being bome mostly by the older industrial workers.
Economic growth would hence have important benefits for these
workers by decreasing the size of their extended families.
11.  The  finding of a  strong positive relationship between
output growth and worker earnings suggests  that a firm's ability
to pay is an important determinant of worker earnings and that
the resumption of economic  growth  would also benefit workers in
terms of significant earnings gains.
More generally, the various elements of our study suggest that
the careful design of growth-and  efficiency-oriented  policies,  cast
in the framework of a broadly acceptable social compact, would
significantly  benefit both Senegal's economy and its society.123
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